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Abstract 
 
Recent UK constitutional reforms disclose an opportunity to recognise institutional autonomy 
as a means of enhancing the existing principle of judicial independence. 
 
This thesis explores the recent reforms and the impact they are having on the existing 
principle of judicial independence, with a view to recommending the notion of institutional 
autonomy as a means of further securing that independence. The rationale for further 
legislative protection and investigation of this constitutional principle is found within the 
requisites of the rule of law. The method for achieving a sufficient degree of institutional 
autonomy is a stricter adherence to the separation of powers doctrine. The notion of 
institutional autonomy is considered in detail and the various elements are outlined. These are 
then applied to the United Kingdom Supreme Court to assess the current degree of 
institutional autonomy and make recommendations for ensuring greater independence in 
accordance with the intentions of the CRA 2005.  
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CHAPTER 1 – AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Rationale  
 
This thesis will primarily consider the meaning and use of the term “institutional autonomy”, 
within the parameters of the United Kingdom (UK) constitution. The Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005 (CRA 2005), among other recent reforms outlined below, provides statutory 
recognition of judicial independence for the first time- and, as will be demonstrated by this 
thesis, provides an opportunity for institutional autonomy.1 Recent reforms such as the 
alterations to the office of Lord Chancellor, the creation of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission and the new Supreme Court for the UK, are all reflections of how an 
independent judiciary may be able to strengthen the rule of law. As will be discussed 
throughout this thesis, many commentators point to the lack of clarity regarding the true 
meaning of judicial independence and how, in turn, it should be upheld under the 
Constitutional Reform Act. Now seems to be an opportune time to make suggestions for how 
this independence may be further enhanced. The term institutional autonomy is an additional 
perspective from which to view fundamental principles such as judicial independence, the rule 
of law and the separation of powers. Acknowledgement of this term will lead to a judiciary 
with increased self-government and the ability to function in a more independent manner. The 
independence of individual judges, while important, is not a primary concern of this thesis but 
it is rather the collective independence of the judiciary and judicial institutions that is to be 
focused upon. From an institutional perspective, the reforms have been particularly 
significant. When there are such significant alterations to institutions such as the House of 
                                                        
1 The provisions relating to judicial independence, and of use here, are sections 1, 3 and 23 of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 205, ch.4. 
~ 2 ~ 
 
 
Lords, it must be examined why those changes were made. Why was it felt necessary to 
remove the judicial element, the Law Lords, from the House of Lords? And what benefits 
were hoped for in creating an entirely separate Supreme Court? Have those hopes been 
realised? These are all important questions that this thesis will strive to answer. While related 
principles and details will be discussed where necessary, the Supreme Court for the United 
Kingdom will provide the focus of this research.  
 
This thesis will argue that the institutional autonomy of the UK’s highest court must be 
enhanced due to the changing nature and role of the Court. This argument is supported by the 
focus on judicial independence in the drafting of the CRA 2005: demonstrating the need for 
clearer separation and autonomy to clarify the relationship between the judiciary and the other 
branches of government. Although there is no substantial research on the subject of 
institutional autonomy itself, related ideas and principles have been researched extensively for 
hundreds of years and provide a basis from which institutional autonomy can develop.2 Much 
research has been done discussing the place within the constitution of the main constitutional 
principles such as judicial independence, the separation of powers and the rule of law within 
the British constitutional arrangements; and the links and relationships between these 
principles is a topic for debate.3 For example, the rule of law calls for an independent 
judiciary, and the CRA 2005 calls for greater independence in order that the rule of law may 
be strengthened.4 Although the value of the rule of law is widely recognised, identifying the 
ways in which to strengthen it would be beneficial to many constitutional actors and protect 
                                                        
2 These main ideas include judicial independence, the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
3 S Burbank and B Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach 
(Sage Publications, California 2002). P.H. Russell and D.M. O’Brien, Judicial Independence in the Age of 
Democracy: critical perspectives from around the world (University Press of Virginia, Virginia 2001). M.J.C. 
Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (OUP, Oxford 1967). NW Barber, 'Prelude to the 
separation of powers' (2001) CLJ 59, 88 gave further context to the ideas and considers others. 
4 Part 1, Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  
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individuals at all levels. Each of these principles, and the research surrounding them, will be 
considered in some detail below. Due to the ambiguity of our constitution and the lack of a 
single, constitutional document, there is no clear-cut explanation of each principle and how it 
should be applied. A critical discussion of the understanding of each will allow conclusions to 
be drawn as to the role the notion of institutional autonomy may play in fortifying their 
existence. 
 
 
Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom  
The process of constitutional reform in the UK is not new, however since 1998 there have 
been a series of fundamental constitutional changes in the United Kingdom with the process 
of reform including the CRA 2005. A number of factors have influenced reform agendas, 
none more so than the consequences of the UK’s membership of the European Union and the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights in domestic law by way of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. These changes, along with the growth of judicial power through 
judicial review, have meant that there has been a renewed focus on the functions of the 
judiciary and their independence.  
 
In his recent book, The New British Constitution, Vernon Bogdanor discusses how the recent 
constitutional reforms have resulted in significant changes and argues for the creation of a 
new constitutional order.5  The overall aim of constitutional reformers, it is felt by Bogdanor, 
is to improve the quality of government, done, in part, through increased emphasis on the 
importance of a clearer separation of powers. As a result of this aim, it became clear that the 
                                                        
5 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009). 
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position of several judicial elements in the constitution needed addressing: the office and role 
of Lord Chancellor, the position of the Law Lords in the Upper Chamber and the need to 
ensure judicial appointments were made on a more transparent and non-partisan basis. 
Professor Bogdanor also gives an interesting explanation for the reasons why Britain has 
never codified its constitution, thus reducing the need to reform the constitution with such a 
piecemeal approach. This, he feels, largely relates to a lack ‘constitutional moments’; such 
times when a written constitution is needed in order to provide a fresh start for a country and 
re-establish the role and purpose of constitutional institutions, such as a judiciary. 6 
 
During the late 1800s a certain degree of depoliticisation of the judiciary had occurred, 
making appointments based on merits and suitability rather than political allegiances.7 
However, the Conservative Prime Minister, Salisbury, did not believe in achieving a 
separation of powers or balancing the power between the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. The judiciary under his leadership consisted of former Conservative MPs in large 
numbers and he was able to rely on their backing to provide robust, authoritative support for 
his policies. Such a politicized judiciary highlighted the need for an independent judiciary due 
to negative implications for the rule of law and changes have been made, in varying degrees, 
over the last hundred years. The years up until 1970 were described by Robert Stevens as a 
‘wasteland’ for Public Law and the courts, as very few cases were heard and little focus was 
given to judicial issues (namely due to the repercussions within society and the reaction 
within government to the first and second world wars).8 It was after this time that there was a 
notable change in the dynamics of the constitution; one main reason being an increase in 
                                                        
6 Ibid., p11. 
7 R Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Hart Publishing, Abingdon 2002) 
p14. 
8 Ibid., at page 27. 
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judicial power. The increase in power came about due to a number of factors, two of which 
will be discussed here: the UK’s membership of the European Union and the significant 
growth in judicial review. 
 
The European Communities Act 1972 meant that European Community law was now 
enforceable in British courts. The impact of this was that the courts would be responsible for 
enforcing European legislation, such as directives thus widening the parameters of the judicial 
role. If there was a Community law in conflict with a piece of UK legislation, then that 
Community law was supreme. The role of judges to challenge the legislature in times of 
conflict between Community and domestic law gave judges a certain degree of power and a 
new level of stature in the constitutional arrangements. The impact of having this power 
resulted in the judiciary having a forum and a reason to challenge Parliamentary decision-
making.9 Several writers have noted how it is during the time before and after the introduction 
of the European Communities Act 1972 that the judiciary began to involve themselves more 
in terms of offering opinion and discussing political issues, although still within the 
parameters of the judicial role.10 During a period of acknowledged judicial restraint from the 
late nineteenth century until after the Second World War, there was little opportunity or will 
for the judiciary to become involved in the political arena. Stevens noted how during this 
time, although the powers conferred upon the judiciary were limited, their prestige and status 
as an institution ‘flourished’ as they were able to avoid scrutiny by not getting involved in 
politics; something which is now pertinent if analysing the reformed position of the judiciary 
                                                        
9  One notable example of this can be seen in the Factortame litigation R v. Transport Secretary, ex parte 
Factortame (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 603. 
10 Two such writers are K Malleson, The New Judiciary: The effects of expansion and activism (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, Aldershot 1999) and D Nicol, EC membership and the judicialization of British politics 
(OUP, Oxford 2001). 
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within contemporary constitutional arrangements. 11  However, a judiciary withdrawn from 
political debate would not last and from the 1950s onwards, an increase in judicial power 
began to emerge. In 1966, the House of Lords acknowledged its law-making role when it held 
that it would no longer be bound by its own previous decisions and this is felt by some to be a 
pivotal moment in the history.12 
 
As noted above, the dual-aspect change in the judicial role can be seen clearly in one 
example: the case of R v. Transport Secretary, ex parte Factortame (No 2).13 In this case, 
there was a conflict between Community and domestic law. The House of Lords held that the 
Queen’s Bench Division had acted outside of its powers in granting interim injunction against 
the Secretary of State who wished to enforce Part 2 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 
against the Spanish fishermen. It referred the matter to the European Court of Justice asking 
about the status of domestic and Community law. The European Court of Justice held that if 
the only rule preventing the granting of interim relief were a national rule, then Community 
law would override that rule. This was a significant decision in terms of its consequence for 
domestic law, but also in terms of judicial decision-making and the powers they had in 
relation to the legislature;to have the power to ‘dis-apply’ legislation and force a review of its 
application was a significant power to hold for any court. It would be even more important 
that the judiciary, as an institution, was seen as independent from political institutions to 
avoid accusations of partisan decision-making and ultimately protecting the interests of 
citizens of the State. The Factortame litigation, which was ongoing after 1991, is a prominent 
illustration of the growth of judicial power in the UK. 
                                                        
11 R Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993) page163. 
12 K Malleson, The New Judiciary: The effects of expansion and activism (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
Aldershot 1999) p10, although this statement was rebutted by Lord Reid in ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972) 
Society of Public Teachers of Law, 22. 
13
 [1990] 1 AC 603. 
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The other explanation of the growth of judicial power, which began prior to the introduction 
of the European Communities Act 1972, is the increase in judicial review. There is some 
debate of exactly why judicial review developed as it did, but three possibilities are: the 
increase in badly-drafted legislation, the number of gaps in the legislation that were left for 
the judges to fill, and a growing public demand for limiting power of the executive branch of 
government.14 The judicial review process is the ability of the courts to question decisions of 
the State on behalf of the public. As a basis, judicial review is not the procedure for courts to 
determine the merits of governmental decisions, rather whether or not the actions taken are 
taken within powers conferred upon them.15 There have been arguments made by the 
judiciary and other commentators that the increase in judicial power was not a conscious 
decision, but a necessity ‘thrust’ upon the judges and occurred as a result of a changing 
political landscape during the 1980s and 1990s.16 However, there are also arguments that the 
increased control of administrative action by the courts is a significant achievement.17 The 
importance of judicial independence as a result of this growth in power will be discussed 
later. 
 
The growth in judicial power, in the ways outlined above, led some people to begin to to 
question position of certain institutions within the constitution,  such as the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords and the office of the Lord Chancellor. Since the 1980s, the 
                                                        
14 Ibid., at page 18. Professor Malleson quotes Lord Wilberforce’s explanation for the rise in judicial review. 
15 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009) pp 81-83.See also Nicolas 
Bamforth, ‘Current issues in United Kingdom constitutionalism: an introduction’ (2011) IJCL 79,. 
16 J Waltman, Judicial activism in England (1991), in K Holland (ed), Judicial Activism in Comparative 
Perspective (Macmillan, London 1991). 
17 Lord Diplock expressed such sentiments, claiming that having increased control was one of the greatest 
achievements he had experienced in his lifetime. He saw it as a beneficial development. 
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Labour Party had been keen to reform the justice system of England and Wales18 However, 
there was not as much focus on the constitution at this time; with more discussion of 
ministerial responsibility and involvement in the law.19 The 1995 Access to Justice Policy 
Paper demonstrated the very clear intention by New Labour to bring about significant change 
to the court service in England and Wales and this came about for a number of reasons The 
overarching principle that was called into question at the time was judicial independence: 
independence of individual judges but also of the judiciary as a branch of government. The 
growth of judicial review in recent years and the introduction of the European Convention on 
Human Rights into domestic law mark two key reasons why it had become essential for the 
judiciary to be seen to be as independent as possible.20 The European Convention was 
enforceable in UK law after in 2000 following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998.2122  
 
During this time of reform, a number of problems for judicial institutions and the operation of 
the separation of powers were. Firstly, the office of Lord Chancellor was scrutinised for its 
involvement in all three branches of Government. Before 2005, the Lord Chancellor was 
Head of the Judiciary for England and Wales, a member of the Executive sitting in the 
Cabinet and also the Speaker in the House of Lords; such an overlap seemed justified by the 
need to link the judiciary with the other branches of government. It was felt by some that as a 
                                                        
18 See the controversial policy paper, Meet the Challenge: Make the Change, which was accepted at the Party 
conference in 1989. 
19 See Professor Rodney Brazier, ‘The Judiciary’ in R Blackburn and R Plant, Constitutional Reform: The 
Labour Government’s Constitutional Reform Agenda (Longman, Harlow 1999), Chapter 16, for more 
information on the specific agenda. 
20 Diana Woodhouse, ‘The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 – defending judicial independence the English way’ 
(2007) IJCL 154. These will be discussed in detail in later sections of this chapter. 
21 The impact of judicial review and of the European Convention on Human Rights will be discussed in detail in 
the following sections: “Judicial Independence” and “The Constitutional Reform Act 2005”. 
22 For a full list of the main reforms see, V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2009), page 4, 5. 
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result of the overlapping functions, this role lacked constitutional integrity and showed a 
distinct lack of importance given to the separation of powers doctrine.23 How this role was to 
be altered will be examined in the next section. The other constitutional anomaly in relation to 
the separation of the three main branches of government was the position of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords. The House of Lords, the second chamber, alongside the 
House of Commons, plays a fundamental role in the legislative process of the UK.. Although 
the powers they have currently to delay legislation have been severely restricted, there is still 
an enormous reliance upon the Lords in terms of revising and amending legislation put 
forward in the Commons. And it is this involvement in the legislative process by the Lords 
that called into question the status and independence of the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords.  The main concern in relation to the Appellate Committee was the involvement of 
the judiciary in the legislative process and other Parliamentary matters.24 The perception of 
the Law Lords’ role had to align with the separation of powers and creating a separate 
institution, such as the Supreme Court, would allow this to start. David Pannick outlines four 
factors he felt provided the ‘impetus’ for the removal of the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords and the Supreme Court’s creation.25 They were: the existing composition of 
the House of Lords was unsatisfactory, with unelected members and hereditary peers; the 
UK’s membership of the European Union and subsequent enactment of the Human Rights 
Act requiring the Law Lords to adjudge decisions made by Parliament and a process in which 
they were involved; the potential for claims to be made under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, since the European Court of Human Rights stated that the 
                                                        
23 Diana Woodhouse, ‘The Office of Lord Chancellor’ (1998) PL 617, 632. 
24 Lord Windlesham spoke on the matter in 2005 and stated that the judges in the Lords had refrained from 
involving themselves in parliamentary debate for some years, but the perception had to change. 
25 D Pannick, ‘"Better that a horse should have a voice in the House [of Lords] than that a judge should" (Jeremy 
Bentham): replacing the Law Lords by a Supreme Court’ (2009) PL 723, 736. 
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judiciary must be independent and be seen to be independent26; and finally, an influential 
speech made by the late Lord Bingham to the Constitutional Unit in May 2002 in which he 
stated the need for a supreme court in the UK.27  
 
As Pannick states, the Government did not appear to take any notice of Lord Bingham’s 
proposals until the summer in 2003. One significant event in the reform process was the 
announcement of a new Supreme Court for the UK and the removal of the Office of Lord 
Chancellor on the back of a cabinet reshuffle. As it transpired, it was not possible, in practice, 
to remove an office that had mention in hundreds of statutes and there was widespread 
outrage amongst politicians and lawyers that the Prime Minister had attempted to make such 
fundamental changes without, it seemed, much consultation with anyone, most importantly, 
the judiciary. The reforms were outlined in a Sunday newspaper and did not appear to reflect 
previous discussions on the topic, reaching back over the last decade.28 The introduction of 
the Constitutional Reform Bill in the following year provided the Government’s response to 
the events of the previous summer and sought to recognise and formally acknowledge the 
importance of judicial independence. The judicial focus of the reforms throughout the last two 
decades may be, as stated by some writers, partly due to an increased public interest in 
judicial business.29 The reality is that there is little public interest in the workings of the 
constitution and very little awareness of what it would mean to have a truly independent 
judiciary. However, a degree of transparency within the justice system is important due to the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, the increase in judicial review and also by 
request of the European Court of Human Rights.  
                                                        
26 The potential impact of Article 6(1) will be discussed in later section. 
27 Ibid., at page 730. 
28 A Le Sueur, 'New Labour's next (surprisingly quick) steps in constitutional reform' (2003) PL p368. 
29 See K Malleson, The New Judiciary: The effects of expansion and activism (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
Aldershot 1999) p3. 
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Constitutional Reform Act 2005  
The CRA 2005 establishes four significant changes that impact on the judiciary: the changes 
made to the office of the Lord Chancellor; the creation of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission; the creation of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC); and the 
declaration of a guarantee of continued judicial independence by section 3.  
 
The Government consultation paper, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United 
Kingdom, stated the Blair Government’s intentions to redress the balance between the 
judiciary and the other branches of government to “…put it on a modern footing.”30 The CRA 
2005 came to fruition after a controversial passage through Parliament during 2004.31 The 
Labour Government sought to enact the Bill very quickly, within the year of its introduction, 
but a House of Lords Select Committee prevented this from happening; noting that it was 
somewhat rare to find an Act of Parliament declaring its sole aim is to reform the 
constitution.3233 The implications of the Act for judicial institutions relate mainly to their 
independence: whether through changes to the office of Lord Chancellor; by creating a 
separate body for judicial appointments; by establishing a separate Supreme Court; or by 
giving statutory recognition of the constitutional principle of judicial independence.  
 
Previously, the Lord Chancellor has responsibilities in all the areas of government: the 
judiciary, the legislature and the executive. The role required the Lord Chancellor to be a 
guardian of judicial independence and represent the judiciary in Government; he was also to 
                                                        
30 Department For Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, 
July 2003, CP11/03, at para. 1. 
31 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c.4. 
32 HL Select Committee of the Constitution, Constitutional Reform Act 2005: 5th report of session 2005-06. HL 
paper 83 published 13 December 2005. Available at: accessed 30 September 2010. 
33 Ibid. at page 6. 
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act as a member of the cabinet, being involved in political debate; and finally, as Speaker of 
the House of Lords he also had legislative commitments. The justification of such a 
constitutionally anomalous role was, in theory, to link the arms of government together. 
However, in more recent years the role attracted a great deal of criticism. The Lord 
Chancellorship under Derry Irvine had become a high profile and increasingly political role 
and he himself attracted criticism for his relationship to the Prime Minister and also his 
outspoken opinion on matters of government. The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 
meant there was growing concern over the possibility of claims under Article 6(1), the right to 
a fair trial.34 A Lord Chancellor who assumed such a prominent role in the business of the 
Executive could, it was argued, prevent him maintaining his other role of defending judicial 
independence. There was a contradiction of the objectives of his various commitments and the 
role was, as a result, deemed unsatisfactory.  The Cabinet re-shuffle in June 2003 was to see 
the attempted abolition of the office but as soon became apparent, it was impossible to abolish 
a role that was so heavily embedded in statute. The Government response was to create the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs and appoint a Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs. The new Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, Lord Falconer, had to step in 
and take on the business of Lord Chancellor.35 An important change was that the Lord Chief 
Justice became the Head of the Judiciary. However, the Lord Chancellor’s links to the 
judiciary were maintained under the CRA 2005 and other historical legislation. Chapter 3 will 
consider whether the Lord Chancellor’s obligations toward the judiciary under the CRA 2005 
have been met and are being met by the current Lord Chancellor. 
 
                                                        
34 D Woodhouse, ‘The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 – defending judicial independence the English way’ 
(2007) IJCL 154, 155. 
35 This is how the situation remained until 2007 when the Ministry of Justice was created and the Lord 
Chancellor became Secretary of State for Justice.  
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The other important aim of the Act is to create a separate body for judicial appointments. 
Previously, the Lord Chancellor had been heavily involved in the process. Lord Falconer 
deemed it unacceptable for the appointments to be made entirely by a Government minister; a 
positive move for judicial independence. Following the enactment of the CRA 2005, the 
Judicial Appointments Commission was created in April 2006 with the aim of creating a more 
transparent and depoliticised process. While the Commission must still make appointments 
recommendations to the Lord Chancellor, the main objective was to increase transparency and 
reduce scope for partisan political considerations to feature in judicial appointments.  The 
2005 Act stipulates that the Chairman of the Commission be a lay member. It also sets out the 
composition of the other members: five must be judicial members; two must be professional 
members (one barrister and one solicitor); five must be lay members; one must be a tribunal 
member; and one must be a lay justice member.  
 
By inviting lay members as well as those from the judicial profession, a heightened degree of 
transparency is created and there is less opportunity for decisions to be made based on 
political beliefs and agendas. Aside from that, it would now be against the law to appoint on 
any other basis than is set out by the CRA 2005. The CRA 2005, Part 4 requires appointments 
to be made based on a number of stipulations: to select candidates based on merit; to select 
individuals of good character; and to have regard for the need to encourage diversity within 
the judiciary.36 A discussion of whether the establishment of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission has resulted in a more diverse judiciary is not for this thesis, but indicates a 
positive change for the judiciary. 
                                                        
36 See sections 63(2), 63(3) and 65(3) respectively. 
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The third reform of specific interest is the creation of the new Supreme Court for the UK. The 
creation of the Supreme Court by Part 3, section 23 of the CRA 2005 has given the UK a final 
court of appeal that is physically separate from Parliament. The Supreme Court is not a part of 
Her Majesty’s Court Service unlike all other courts in the courts system but rather is largely 
autonomous, having significant self-determination as to its finance, human resource 
management and other support; thus reflecting the independent nature of its administration.37 
The main objective of its creation was to remove the Appellate Committee from the House of 
Lords, operating as the final court of appeal in the UK. Lord Bingham, in his speech to the 
Constitution Unit at University College London in 2002, explained his hopes for the new 
Court: that it would result in the ‘…regularisation and rationalisation’ of the place of the 
Appellate Committee within the constitution.38 He was not pushing for the Court to be given 
more powers but, as stated above, clarify the existing position of its core functions within the 
constitutional arrangements. The new Supreme Court began its work in October 2009 in its 
new location at the Middlesex Guildhall. David Pannick noted how Parliament Square will, 
‘…with pleasing symmetry, be devoted to Parliament, the executive (Whitehall and Downing 
Street), the Church (Westminster Abbey) and now the Supreme Court.’39 There were twelve 
Supreme Court Justices, existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who moved over from the 
House of Lords to continue their judicial roles in the new setting. The jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court remains as the final appeal court for England and Wales, under the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Acts 1876 and 1888 but the new Court now also has jurisdiction to discuss 
                                                        
37 Information given by Jenny Rowe, Chief Executive of the Supreme Court in  “Speech on the Status of the 
Supreme Court” 17 November 2008 http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/supreme-court-conference-rowe-
speech.htm accessed 18 November 2009. 
38 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom’ The Constitution Unit Spring 
Lecture, 1 May 2002, at page 10. 
39 D Pannick, ‘"Better that a horse should have a voice in the House [of Lords] than that a judge should" (Jeremy 
Bentham): replacing the Law Lords by a Supreme Court’ (2009) PL 723, 736.  
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devolution matters that has moved from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.40 New 
appointments to the Supreme Court are made following recommendations from a selection 
committee, but the CRA 2005 specifically reduced the involvement of the Lord Chancellor in 
this process.41 A new selection committee is created for each new appointment and the 
committee consists of: the President of the Supreme Court, the Court’s Deputy, plus a 
representative from the Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. The Lord Chancellor has the power to accept or reject the decision of 
the committee but any accepted decisions are then forwarded to the Prime Minister to gain 
final approval and royal assent from the Queen.42  
 
The CRA 2005 has made clear its objectives in terms of securing the continued independence 
of the judiciary of England and Wales. The key section relating to judicial independence is 
Section 3 ‘Guarantee of continued judicial independence’. Subsection (1) states, 
 
The Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all with responsibility for 
matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must 
uphold the continued independence of the judiciary. 
 
This is the first, explicit, statutory recognition of judicial independence in English public law 
and has, inevitably, had, and will continue to have, many consequences for judicial 
institutions as will be seen throughout this thesis, more specifically in Chapter 3 when case 
law based on this section will be considered.43 The Act provides some suggestion on how this 
                                                        
40 The specific devolution matters which may be discussed under this jurisdiction can be seen in, Jo Lennan, ‘A 
Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: a note on early days’ (2010) CJQ 140. 
41 Specific guidance on the appointment of new Supreme Court justices is given by the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005. Section 25 of the Act sets out the statutory qualifications for appointment. But Section 25 has been 
amended by Sections 50-52 of the Tribunals and Enforcement Act 2007. 
42 The arguments for parliamentary involvement in this process are considered in Mary L. Clark’s article, 
‘Introducing a Parliamentary confirmation process for the new Supreme Court justices: its pros and cons, and 
lessons learned from the US experience’ (2010) PL 464, 481. 
43 The Act of Settlement 1701 gave judges’ tenure based on good practice, not Royal will and this, it was felt, 
helped secure a degree of judicial independence. Therefore, this could be said to be the first statute with a 
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may be done: section 3, subsection (5) states, ‘The Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the 
Crown must not seek to influence particular judicial decisions through any special access to 
the judiciary’; subsection (6) states that, ‘The Lord Chancellor must have regard to— (a) the 
need to defend that independence; (b) the need for the judiciary to have the support necessary 
to enable them to exercise their functions; and (c) the need for the public interest in regard to 
matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice to be properly 
represented in decisions affecting those matters.44 These provisions, while positive for judicial 
independence, do not provide sufficient guidance to ensure the independence of the judiciary 
is affected.45  As Diana Woodhouse discussed, this section raises several issues.46 While it 
outlines what the Lord Chancellor, and all those involved in the administration of justice, 
should show awareness of – the independence of the judiciary- it does not explain further how 
this should be done. This may be due to the fact that the drafting is not detailed enough, or it 
may be more due to the nature of the principle of judicial independence as it is understood in 
the UK. The principle, and the links to recent constitutional reforms and its relationship with 
institutional autonomy will be discussed below. 
 
With all this in mind, it is possible to separate the aims and consequences of the Act into two 
main categories, institutional changes and declaratory statements. The institutional changes 
include: forming a separate body for judicial appointments (the Judicial Appointments 
Commission); the removal of the Appellate Committee from the House of Lords and creating 
                                                                                                                                                                             
specific aim of creating judicial independence, whereas the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 seeks to continue 
that independence through various means. 
44 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ch. 4. 
45 Explanatory notes on Section 3, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. These note also state that this section 
should be read in conjunction with Part 1 of the Courts Act 2003, which sets out the duty of the Lord Chancellor 
to ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to support the carrying on of the business of the courts of 
England and Wales. 
46 D Woodhouse, ‘The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 – defending judicial independence the English way’ 
(2007) IJCL 156. 
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a new Supreme Court for the UK, separate from Parliament; and altering the office of Lord 
Chancellor to ensure a clearer separation of powers. The declaratory statements in Sections 1 
states that the Act does not ‘adversely affect’ the rule of law and Section 3 states the need to 
‘uphold the continued independence’ of the judiciary.47 From an institutional perspective, 
there seems to be some tension between the declaratory statements and the institutional 
changes made. The sections above appear to show an intention to maintain a status quo, 
continuing the independent state of the judiciary and not adversely affecting the rule of law. 
However, some significant institutional changes have been made to the administration of 
justice (the Supreme Court and the alterations to the role of Lord Chancellor) that suggest a 
need for change and a recognition that previous arrangements were unsatisfactory for 
ensuring the rule of law or judicial independence. These mainly relate to the implications for 
judicial independence and this point will continue to be discussed below. 
 
The sections above have discussed the impact of constitutional reform in the UK and, more 
specifically, the CRA 2005 and its implications for the constitution. Therefore, it is now 
appropriate to consider in more detail other principles referred to above: the rule of law, the 
separation of powers and judicial independence. The following sections will cover some of 
the main ideas surrounding those principles and consider links to British constitutional reform 
and to the subsequent discussion of institutional autonomy. 
 
Judicial independence  
The overriding principle behind these reforms is judicial independence. With greater powers 
being conferred on the judiciary, the weight of any decisions made relies on the judiciary 
                                                        
47 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ch. 4. 
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being free from any accusations of partisanship or control from Government. This section 
considers both facets of judicial independence: individual independence and collective 
independence although more weight is given to collective independence in this thesis. It 
outlines the move toward greater collective independence as a result of the CRA 2005 and 
how this in turn underlines the need for institutional autonomy. 
 
The constitutional principle of judicial independence underpins the main focus of this thesis, 
institutional autonomy; it is in place to ensure that the rule of law is upheld. Its origins date 
back to the 1600s when it was decided by Coke, in the case of Prohibitions del Roy, that the 
King could no longer act as judge due to his lack of knowledge of the law and impartiality, 
and that an independent court of judges must administer justice in England.48 It first 
recognition by statute, albeit indirect, was in the Act of Settlement 1700 where it was decided 
that judges who were given tenure based on merit rather than the King’s will would be seen to 
be more independent. This historical synopsis of its early being may lead one to think that 
there is a theory of judicial independence demonstrating clear ideas and principles in order to 
decide if a judge, or judicial institution, is, in fact, independent. However, this is not the case. 
Robert Stevens described the notion as nothing more than ‘constitutional rhetoric’ whose 
‘penumbra’ is vague.49 Some consensus has developed which suggest the main ways judicial 
independence is preserved is by: security of salary, judges’ pay is protected by statute not 
government; security of tenure, a protection from dismissal if they simply disagree with 
ministers; a protection from political pressure and intimidation; and being immune from 
                                                        
48 (1607) 12 Co Rep 63. Coke declared that, ‘…the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case… according 
to the law and custom of England; [because] true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent 
science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England’. 
49 Robert Stevens, Judicial Independence in England: A loss of innocence, can be seen in P.H. Russell and D.M. 
O’Brien, Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: critical perspectives from around the world 
(University Press of Virginia, Virginia 2001), chapter 8 at page 155. 
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liability while serving in office. This gives very basic examples of how judicial independence 
may be preserved and impartiality encouraged, but it does not take in to account external 
factors beyond the control of individual judges which may affect their independence. The 
need for greater judicial independence, it has been stated by Government, is to enhance the 
public perception of the judiciary. Lord Norton of Louth, during a debate on the Supreme 
Court and judicial reforms in February 2004, referred to the Government proceeding on a 
‘perception of a perception.50 He felt strongly that the reasons for reform should be based on 
actual data and not a perceived perception of what the public concerns may be now, or in the 
future in relation to the independence of the judiciary. As mentioned in the House of Lords 
Constitutional Reform Bill Committee’s first report, after assessing public perception of the 
existing position of the judiciary and the proposed reforms, ‘…opinion does not run high.’51 
The report goes on to quote Professor Stevens who used an example from 1874 when the 
Conservative Party tried to interfere with the Imperial Court of Appeal on the basis of 
perceived public opinion; The Times noted then, ‘…there is no public opinion on this subject 
any more than there is on the transit of Venus.’52 Professor Stevens concludes that the case 
was similar in 2004. What the drafting of the CRA 2005 did make clear was that it intended 
for judicial independence to be upheld; even if it was not clear about why this was necessary 
or how it should be done. Therefore, as it is a clear aim of the Act, it is important to show the 
basic premise of the principle and also how it relates to the idea of institutional autonomy.  
 
The first type of judicial independence accepted in the UK is individual independence. This 
relates to the independence of an individual judge when performing his or her judicial 
                                                        
50 Hansard, HL, Vol 657, (12 February 2004). Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldhansrd/vo040212/text/40212-09.htm 
51 House of Lords, Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, First Report, Session 2003-04, at para 117.  
52 Ibid. 
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functions. It is logical to assume that in order for a trial or hearing to be conducted in a fair 
and impartial manner, the judge must be free from interference or pressure from any other 
source. Others sources of interference may include pressure from other judges, government 
ministers or the public, but it may also include a degree of internal pressure in the form of 
personal beliefs and motivations or involvement in a cause. A ‘galvanization’ of the 
importance of individual independence was made in the now famous Pinochet case.53 This 
case involved former Chilean dictator, General Pinochet, who, on a trip to the UK, had a 
warrant issued for his arrest by a Spanish judge. This arrest was for crimes against humanity. 
By a broad reading of the Extradition Act 1989 in the House of Lords, it was decided that 
sovereign immunity was not to be given; overruling an earlier decision to the contrary by the 
then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham of Cornhill.54 The severity of the crimes, it was felt, 
was enough for human rights to take precedence over English law. While the decision itself 
was internationally controversial for the importance it gave to human rights, it emerged that 
Lord Hoffman, one of the Law Lords sitting on the case, was heavily involved with Amnesty 
International, a human rights organisation, and his wife was employed full-time by that same 
organisation. Immediately, the impartiality of his decision was questioned, amid accusations 
of bias, and a new hearing was ordered. It was a real test for the uncertain notion of judicial 
independence and at this time it is fair to say that there was a real public interest in the 
judiciary and its position. It reinforces the need, not only for a judge to be independent and 
impartial, but for that judge to be seen to be independent and impartial to ensure public 
confidence in the administration of justice; that decisions are reached in a fair and unbiased 
way, based purely on the law and evidence in the case. 
 
                                                        
53 R v. New Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex. p. Pinochet Ugarte [1998] 4 All ER 89 (HL).  
54 The events surrounding this case are discussed in detail in Robert Stevens, A loss of innocence? Judicial 
independence and the separation of powers (1999) QJLS 370. 
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The other type of judicial independence operates in addition to the first: that the judiciary as 
an institution and separate branch of government is seen to be independent. It is this element 
of the independence that is of particular interest in this thesis and will be focused on from here 
on. The independence of the judiciary as a whole is often described as collective 
independence. It links closely to the rule of law and the separation of powers, both of which 
will be discussed shortly. Dame Mary Arden described the judiciary as having institutional 
independence when there was respect shown for it as being a separate institution.55 In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, supporting the idea of institutional autonomy of the judiciary, there 
was recognition given to the fact that the judiciary, as an institution, needed to have greater 
autonomy and control over its administration and funding. Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued 
for a greater degree of control for judges in both delivering judgments (‘the final product’) but 
also ‘…the administrative infrastructure on which the delivery and enforcement of that 
product depend.’56 In support of, and furthering, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s statement, Sir 
Francis Purchas said that, ‘Constitutional independence will not be achieved if funding for the 
administration of justice remains subject to the influences of the political marketplace.’57 As 
will be demonstrated, it is this need for greater institutional autonomy of the judiciary that 
will strengthen the existing independence. These arguments for increased control to be given 
to judicial institutions and increased collective independence of the judiciary have not come to 
fruition based on unrealistic government ideology. They are in response to a topic that has 
called into question the independence of the judiciary: the growth of judicial power. The CRA 
2005 enabled a move toward an increase in the collective independence of the judiciary by 
removing the Law Lords from the House of Lords and altering the office of Lord Chancellor 
                                                        
55 M Arden, ‘Judicial Independence and Parliaments’ in K Zeigler, D Baranger and AW Bradley (eds.), 
Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments (2007) chapter 10. 
56 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, ‘The independence of judges in the 1980s’, 11th F.A. Mann Lecture. Referenced in 
Thomas H. Bingham, ‘Judicial Independence’ (1997) Arbitration 86, 93. 
57 Sir Francis Purchas, ‘What is happening to judicial independence?’ (1994) NLJ 1306. 
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so that the functions no longer overlapped causing problems in terms of the judiciary’s 
independence. Previously in the UK there has been acknowledgment of the two approaches to 
judicial independence, but now there is a clear move toward recognising the importance of 
greater collective independence. The means for ensuring this still further is to recognise the 
need for institutional autonomy and provides added means for creating a greater degree of 
autonomy in the functions of the judiciary. The ways in which this autonomy may be 
achieved, and specifically what it means for the judiciary to be institutional autonomous will 
be discussed in Chapter 2. This section focuses on two main reasons, or explanations, for this 
growth: the development of the judicial review process and the introduction of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into English law by way of the Human Rights Act 1998.  
 
Inevitably, this judicial review function of the judiciary can mean that there may be a number 
of tensions in its relationship with the executive, but these tensions, it is felt by some, are 
justifiable in ensuring a balance of power remains between the executive, the judiciary and the 
legislature.58 This status and power to review has not always been in existence to the degree it 
is currently. The specific reasons for the increase in judicial review are not at issue here, but 
the involvement of the judiciary in the process requires an increased level of independence, or 
autonomy, from the other branches of government to reduce any potential criticism of the 
decisions made: that the judgments are based on fact and the law, not on political will or 
personal alliances. The other factor that requires an increased level of judicial independence is 
the introduction of the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act was not designed to 
undermine Parliament’s legislative powers and intention, but allowed for British human rights 
disputes to be settled in British courts instead of requiring litigants to take their case to the 
                                                        
58 One such proponent is Lord Woolf, see Harry Woolf, ‘ Judicial review- the tensions between the executive 
and the judiciary’ (1998) LQR 580. 
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European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.59 An important influence of the HRA on the 
work of the judiciary is Article 6(1): the right to a fair trial. It requires that a stricter view be 
taken of anything that may undermine the independence and impartiality of judicial 
institutions.60 In Procola v Luxembourg, it was stated by the European Court that the fact that 
individuals could be involved in both the legislative and judicial operations of government, 
was casting doubt on the ‘institution’s structural impartiality’.61 It was clear that the Court felt 
strongly about a clearer separation of government powers and the CRA 2005 was a response 
to the developments. It was Parliament’s intention to create a more independent judiciary, and 
reduce the possibility of any claims under Article 6(1), by separating the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords from Parliament and altering the role of Lord Chancellor’s 
office to reduce involvement in every arm of government. As Lord Bingham stated, the 
European Convention is ‘concerned with risks and appearances as well as actualities’.62  
 
Rule of Law  
The rationale behind ensuring a high degree of judicial independence relates to the 
requirements of the rule of law. The collective, or institutional, independence of the judiciary 
needs protection and this protection can be achieved through ensuring judicial institutions are 
able to function in an autonomous manner. A consideration of the main arguments of the 
concept will allow this section to show how the rule of law as it is applied in the UK and 
requires greater institutional autonomy of the judiciary in order to ensure a fair application of 
the law by an independent body.  
                                                        
59 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009) p57, 60. 
60 R Masterman, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: two steps forward, but one step back on judicial 
independence’ (2004) PL 51. 
61 (1996) 22 EHRR 193 at [45], discussed in Roger Masterman, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: two 
steps forward, but one step back on judicial independence’ (2004) PL 52. 
62 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom’ The Constitution Unit Spring 
Lecture, 1 May 2002, at page 3. 
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The basic understanding of the rule of law in relation to judicial independence is that the 
judiciary must be able to make decisions independently, free from any interference. This 
requirement of independence is supported by a clearer adherence to the separation of powers 
doctrine.63 Paul Craig highlights the two main schools of thought surrounding the rule of law. 
He argues that the various theories offered fall into two categories: formals conceptions and 
substantive conceptions. Joseph Raz, AV Dicey and Unger are the key writers he cites as 
supporting the formal conceptions of the rule of law and Dworkin, Sir John laws and Trevor 
Allan are those who he feels best represent the substantive conceptions of the rule of law.64 
While there is not scope to discuss each theory in detail, a summary of the two standpoints 
will be given and the relationship to the requirement of judicial independence discussed. 
 
The formal conception of the rule of law gives an objective understanding of its application. 
Raz supports the notion that such formal rules of law are important in establishing a 
democracy. The formal conceptions do not pass any judgement on whether the law is good or 
bad but instead tests for certainty in the construction and subsequent application of the law.. 
The basic requirement, as put forward by Raz, is that laws should be passed in the correct 
legal manner. This is supplemented by a number of other formal rules: laws should be 
prospective; should be relatively stable; should be guided by open, general and clear rules; 
there should be an independent judiciary; there should be access to the courts; and law 
enforcement agencies should not be allowed to undermine the purpose of the legal rules thy 
are enforcing.65 . The other perspective on the rule of law is that it has a substantive 
                                                        
63 T.R.S. Allan, ‘Judicial deference and judicial review: legal doctrine and legal theory’ (2011) LQR 117. 
64 Paul P. Craig, ‘Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework’ (1997) PL 
467, 487. 
65  Ibid., p469 
~ 25 ~ 
 
 
conception: for those wishing to extend the doctrine beyond these basic, formal rules. The 
substantive viewpoint allows the development of more detailed judgement on the quality of 
the law in question: a merits-based analysis, tested against relevant values and principles. For 
T.R.S. Allan, it is a self-contained, coherent understanding of governmental power, the 
restrictions on that power and thus enabling questions of the use of that power to be 
adjudged.66 This questioning of power gives an example of why judicial independence is 
necessary for the rule of law: if the question being adjudged is one between citizen and State 
or a Government minister, then there must be impartiality on the part of the court. As Lord 
Goldsmith states, some feel that it is solely the ‘constitutional responsibility’ of the judiciary 
to uphold the rule of law but he warns of a monopoly being created and emphasises that it is 
the duty of all constitutional actors to acknowledge the importance of upholding the rule of 
law.67 The CRA 2005 to some extent reinforces this view by listing those responsible for 
upholding the continued independence of the judiciary under section 3. 
 
A relationship between the rule of law and judicial independence is apparent, as stated above, 
from the focus of recent constitutional reforms set out by the CRA 2005. They are not 
mutually exclusive, rather mutually dependent. As Lord Judge stated in a speech in 2009, that 
judicial independence and the rule of law are most often considered as two separate 
principles.68 This is true to an extent but while they are separate, they are also hugely reliant 
on each other’s existence. Lord Judge then described them as being ‘…as closely intertwined 
as a mutually dependent and loving couple after many years of marriage, where one simply 
                                                        
66 TRS Allan, ‘The rule of law as the rule of reason: consent and constitutionalism’ (1999) LQR 115, 221. 
67 The Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General, ‘Government and the Rule of Law in the Modern Age’ 
speech at the London School of Economics, February 22 2006.  
68 A speech by Lord Judge, ‘Judicial Independence and Responsibilities’ 9 April 2009 given at the 16th 
Commonwealth Law Conference in Hong Kong.  
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cannot survive without the other.’69 From this Lord Judge wished to emphasise the 
longstanding reliance on each other of the two principles: they are two stand-alone concepts 
but have been intertwined in their operation for many hundreds of years. The rule of law 
would struggle to exist as it does currently, without the judiciary to uphold it, and the drive 
for greater judicial independence would not exist if the rule of law did not require it as 
‘Judicial indepdnence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law’.70 
 
Therefore in order for the rule of law to be upheld there must be an independent judiciary; 
judicial independence enhances the rule of law by ensuring that a court may make a fair an 
accurate decision based on the law without any external interference from other institutions.  
Some writers describe the rule of law as the main reason for having an independent judiciary, 
to control actions of the executive but avoid accusations of partisanship when reaching a 
decision. If any decision is seen to inhibit the executive’s actions, it will most likely receive 
resistance from either those it affects, or those who view it as too much control.71 These 
modern interpretations of the rule of law, with the focus on government control, ties in with 
the view of T.R.S. Allan given in 1999: that although the rule of law can be interpreted widely 
and have contextual adaptations, for the UK the focus must be on the judiciary, as an 
independent branch of government, to protect the individual rights and freedoms of British 
citizens and to apply the law fairly and universally to all individuals.72 The CRA 2005, while 
stating that the Act does not ‘adversely affect the rule of law’, does seek to create a more 
independent judiciary, in part, by reforming the House of Lords and creating a Supreme 
                                                        
69 Ibid. 
70 The relationship between the rule of law and judicial independence is explicitly mentioned in the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct. Referred to by Lord Judge ‘Judicial Independence and Responsibilities’ 9 April 
2009 given at the 16th Commonwealth Law Conference in Hong Kong. 
71 One such writer is A Mason, ‘Envoi to the House of Lords – a view from afar’ (2009) LQR 585. 
72 TRS Allan, ‘The rule of law as the rule of reason: consent and constitutionalism’ (1999) LQR 115, 221. 
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Court.73 This demonstrates recognition of the importance of the rule of law and the role the 
judiciary plays in protecting it. By creating an institutional separation of the judiciary in the 
Supreme Court, the potential for accusations of a lack of impartiality when discussing matters 
between the citizen and the State is significantly reduced. Previously, it may have unnerved 
critics that an un-elected body could so readily disparage the law-making powers of the 
historically sovereign Parliament. However, this risks becoming an argument once again 
based on the ‘perception of a perception’. Having assessed what judicial independence means 
in the context of the UK and its place in the recent constitutional reforms, a closer look at why 
it is needed was made in this section. The rule of law requires a judiciary independent and 
impartial to monitor the actions of government.  
 
 
A separation of powers  
The final constitutional principle of importance in this introduction is the separation of 
powers. The separation of powers doctrine is the method by which the greater collective 
independence of the judiciary can be ensured and this section will endeavour to show how a 
clearer separation of the branches of government can be ensured, beyond the CRA 2005, by 
recognition of institutional autonomy. John Locke put forward the doctrine of the separation 
of powers in 1690 and it was later developed by Montesquieu. Although the first doctrines did 
not label the separate powers of government as clearly as has become the form more recently 
since the enactment of the CRA 2005, Montesquieu does, broadly speaking, describe three 
roles or functions which must be separate in order to act fairly: ‘enacting law’, a legislative 
role; ‘executing the public resolutions’, the executive function; and ‘trying the causes of the 
                                                        
73 Section 1, Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ch.4. 
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individual’, the judicial process.74 This is the basis for what is now understood by many as the 
separation of powers as applied in the UK. The significance of the separation of powers 
theory has previously been played down as the constitutional arrangements that existed at that 
time demonstrated very little functional or institutional separation. However, the rule of law 
requires an independent judiciary if it is to succeed and the existence of an inter-relationship 
between the three main branches of government although inevitable, must be subject to a 
system of checks and balances.75 Where the powers of government are an accepted part of 
society, there is usually a consensus that those powers must be controlled and limited.76 
Following the rule of law, it can be said that the responsibility for monitoring executive action 
falls to the judiciary. The Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles of the Three Branches 
of Government state the need for the judiciary to demonstrate its separation from the 
executive and the legislature.77 The rules go on to state that in order to create sufficient 
independence there must be judicial autonomy in the following areas: appointments, funding 
and training.78  
 
The requirement of acknowledging the separation of powers doctrine in the UK is met with a 
variety of opinion. Some judges and academics feel it has a limited application, only between 
the judiciary and the legislature, some hold that it is a coverall concept to take in 
miscellaneous constitutional principles, while others see it as a benefit in the organisation and 
critical appreciation of constitutional actors. Recent constitutional reform in the UK reflects a 
                                                        
74 De l’Esprit des Lois: Book XI, chapter 6. See M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 
(OUP, Oxford 1967) p90. 
75 AW Bradley & ID Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (14th edn Pearson Longman, Harlow 2007) 
p78, 89. See also NW Barber, 'Prelude to the separation of powers' (2001) CLJ 59, 88. 
76 M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (OUP, Oxford 1967) p2. 
77 Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles of the Three Branches of 
Government’ November 2003, at pages 11, 14. 
78 Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Judicial independence’ (2002) SLT 105, 111. 
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political will to enhance the separation of the three branches of government, by removing the 
Appellate Committee from the House of Lords, creating a new, separate Supreme Court for 
the UK and by altering the office of Lord Chancellor so that the role does not overlap all three 
branches. Lord Bingham eloquently stated the reasons for reform of the judicial system and 
made suggestions toward the need for an independent Supreme Court in the Constitution Unit 
Spring Lecture, 1 May 2002:  
  
To modern eyes, it was always anomalous that a legislative body should 
exercise judicial power, save in very restricted circumstances. This anomaly 
may not have mattered in the past. But if the House of Lords is to be reformed, 
and even if it is not, the opportunity should be taken to reflect in institutional 
terms what is undoubtedly true in functional terms, that the law lords are judges 
not legislators and do not belong in a House to whose business they can make 
no more than a slight contribution. 79  
 
In response to Lord Bingham’s viewpoint above, the designated functions of each branch of 
government should be carried out with an appropriate degree of institutional separation which 
affords them the necessary degree of autonomy, free of any interference from the other 
branches. This level of institutional separation will support the aims of the European Court of 
Human Rights in ensuring that the judiciary is seen to be independent. The new Supreme 
Court is physically separate from Parliament and is seeking to raise its public profile as an 
independent judicial institution. The removal of the UK’s highest court from the House of 
Lords by the CRA 2005 reinforces Montesquieu’s idea of a formal separation of each branch 
of government. His ideal is not necessarily realised as a result, but it does clarify the separation 
between the judiciary and the legislature.80 Robert Stevens discussed the British balance of 
powers over a clear and rigorously applied separation of the powers of government.81 
                                                        
79 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom’ The Constitution Unit Spring 
Lecture, 1 May 2002, at page 10. 
80 J Lennon, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: a note on early days’ (2010) CJQ 142, 143. 
81 R Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Hart Publishing, Abingdon 2002) 
Chapter 7. 
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Professor Stevens felt, prior to the CRA 2005, the role of Lord Chancellor, the place of the 
Law Lords in the House of Lords and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty prevented a 
clear separation from existing. While the CRA 2005 has sought to remedy some elements of 
his concern, the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament may prevent, he feels, a true 
separation being achieved due to the judiciary being confined to the powers legislated for it. 
Other factors such as funding and reliance on administration may have prevented this 
separation previously, but the creation of the Supreme Court with its degree of funding and 
administrative freedom, will no doubt represent a separation of which Montesquieu would be 
proud. There are other ways in which to more formally separate the judiciary from 
unnecessary constraints in the form of funding and allow for a more independent 
administration of justice. These ways include the need to formally recognise the idea of 
institutional autonomy. 
 
Increased autonomy  
Having considered the principle of judicial independence and how it relates to important 
constitutional elements such as the rule of law and the separation of powers in this thesis, it 
must now be shown how an extension of these ideas could strengthen the existing principles: 
institutional autonomy. A clearer interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, as a 
result of the CRA 2005, has helped to create an increased level of autonomy and 
independence for the judiciary in the form of the Judicial Appointments Commission and the 
new Supreme Court. As Lord Hope mentioned in his article for the Scots Law Times in 2002, 
judicial independence can be secured in this way, through increased judicial autonomy in 
matters such as appointments and funding.82 Institutional autonomy is a term that has not 
                                                        
82 Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Judicial independence’ (2002) SLT 105, 111. 
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received much, if any, recognition within English legal research and literature, and none in the 
historical development of constitutional principles; not because it does not merit the time, 
more that until recently there has not been the opportunity to demonstrate its use and worth 
within the previous constitutional arrangements of the UK. There is beginning to be some 
recognition of the term within legal literature but this is limited and no detailed explanation of 
the term is given.83 This opportunity arises as a result of the changes brought about by the 
CRA 2005. As mentioned in the section above, until now there has been no clear separation of 
the branches of government and therefore any suggestion for increased judicial independence 
through institutional autonomy would have been met with reluctance or amusement due to the 
significance of changes that would need to be made in order to implement such ideas. The 
CRA 2005 has made a separation of the judiciary from Parliament and realised the need to 
enhance this separation in order to ensure a good level of judicial independence. This is why it 
is only now feasible to discuss and suggest ways in which to enhance that independence by 
creating increased autonomy as a result of separation. 
 
Other support for this notion came from Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Sir Francis Purchas 
who both recognised the need for increased autonomy from government in matters such as 
funding and the administration of the justice system.84 As was also seen in the section on 
judicial independence, if a judicial institution can demonstrate collective independence from 
Government, then their decisions in any matter will have greater impartiality. This 
impartiality is what the European Court of Human Rights felt was imperative and for the 
judicial institution to demonstrate that degree of autonomy; demonstrating to any observer, 
                                                        
83 Diana Woodhouse, ‘The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 – defending judicial independence the English way’ 
(2007) IJCL 153, 165. 
84 As per the section ‘Judicial Independence’ in this chapter: Lord Browne-Wilkinson, ‘The independence of 
judges in the 1980s’, 11th F.A. Mann Lecture, referenced in Thomas H. Bingham, ‘Judicial Independence’ (1997) 
Arbitration 86, 93; and Sir Francis Purchas, ‘What is happening to judicial independence?’ (1994) NLJ 1306.  
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including interesting members of the public, that the decisions reached are done so free from 
unnecessary pressures from other sources. The ability for a judicial institution to have control 
of their budget will enable the administration of justice to be designed and planned from a 
judicial perspective, and not based on Government strategy or politics. The importance of 
freedom in relation to the administration of the court will create a specialist recruitment 
process and will reduce accusations of individuals being appointed based on their political 
stance. It would also provide a justification to assess the benefits of any existing links to the 
legislature or the executive. This degree of freedom of administration and funding will also 
improve the training process. The ideas surrounding the term will be explored in significant 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 - INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY  
 
 
The aspects of recent constitutional reform in the UK that are fundamental to this thesis, and 
their impact on established constitutional principles such as judicial independence, the rule of 
law and the separation of powers, have been outlined in the previous chapter. It is now 
pertinent to consider the notion of institutional autonomy and how it could apply in practice 
and what impact it would have on judicial institutions. There will be an exploration of links 
between the collective independence of the judiciary and institutional autonomy in order to 
show how the latter is an extension of the former, rather than a replacement for it. The effects 
of, and reasons for, giving greater power to the judicial branch of government are discussed in 
relation to both the notion of institutional autonomy and the implications for the interaction 
between the three branches.85  
 
Institutional autonomy is, broadly speaking, a term which may be used to describe an 
institution that is self-funding, in charge of its own administration and which operates free 
from any direct and unnecessary interference from other bodies. The notion of institutional 
autonomy is not in itself new, but it has not been widely discussed in a legal context. A clear 
account of what the notion involves and, more specifically, how it can be used within the 
legal system is needed.86 The ideas discussed here are not intended to replace concepts such 
as judicial independence; rather to extend some of the key values underpinning the rule of law 
                                                        
85 Detailed application of the notion of institutional autonomy to the new Supreme Court will take place in 
Chapter 3. 
86 See, for example, Diana Woodhouse, “The Constitutional Reform Act 2005- defending judicial independence 
the English way” (2007) IJCL 157, page 3. Here the term is used within Woodhouse’s discussion of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 but it is not explanation, and an understanding of its place and use is, somewhat, 
presumed. 
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and judicial independence, such as ensuring a judicial institution’s ‘structural impartiality.’87 
In short, the pursuit of greater institutional autonomy, strengthens the existing independence 
of any judicial institution, or at least that is what I begin to argue in this chapter. 
 
As will be seen, the three core requirements when considering institutional autonomy are: 
budgetary freedom, administrative freedom and freedom from unnecessary external 
interference. While these three requirements may be applicable to a range of institutions, 
discussion will focus primarily on judicial institutions. It will be argued that there are varying 
degrees, or levels, of autonomy. The degree of institutional autonomy will be reduced if a 
sufficient amount of budgetary or administrative freedom cannot be demonstrated, and if there 
is some unnecessary interference in the fulfilling of core functions, thus affecting the 
provision of services of that institution. 
 
In order to give a clear account of the notion of institutional autonomy, it is first necessary to 
dissect the meaning of the term and consider two elements individually: institutions and 
autonomy. I therefore begin by drawing on political science literature to discuss what is meant 
by ‘institution’. 
 
Institutions 
Public lawyers frequently refer to the ‘institutions’ of government and judicial institutions in 
particular. However, rarely do public lawyers seek to develop a deeper understanding of what 
an institution is. Discussions do not cover a sufficiently wide variety of perspectives to really 
gain a deep understanding of the nature of institutions more generally. Rather, they focus, for 
                                                        
87 Roger Masterman, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: two steps forward, but one step back on 
judicial independence’ (2004) PL 52. 
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the most part, on the main branches of government and Parliament. It may be that previously 
there has been little need for such a detailed understanding of the term, but the institutional 
focus of recent constitutional reforms suggests it is now important. The most suitable research 
base to begin compiling such an explanation is political science; an area that has offered input 
into discussions of judicial independence previously, but where there has also been extensive 
research into institutions.88 Political scientists, like public lawyers, are interested in the 
workings of government and politics (although political scientists look further into underlying 
behaviours of political systems and conditions affecting the workings of politics). Public 
lawyers focus on political systems from a constitutional and, in particular, a legal perspective; 
discussing the function of the institutions and their relationship with other institutions of 
government within the workings of the constitution, rather than analysing in detail the theory 
behind their existence and how they alter dependent on purpose. This next section will seek to 
reconcile ideas from both fields in order to provide an understanding of ‘institutional 
autonomy’. 
 
There is no single, clear definition of ‘institution’ in the political science literature.89 There 
are instead three broad approaches. First, some political scientists conceptualise institutions 
by looking at their form and design.90 Second, there is an approach which emphasises the 
“grammar” of institutions. This approach seeks to identify the purpose of the institution by 
assessing its nature and type. Finally, there are theories of institutional change which exist to 
explain the changes which take place within institutions, either by design or evolution. Each 
                                                        
88 P. H. Russell, ‘Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence’ – a chapter in P.H. Russell and D.M. 
O’Brien, Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: critical perspectives from around the world 
(University Press of Virginia, Virginia 2001) p 1, 25.  
89 C Kingston & G Caballero ‘ Comparing Theories of Institutional Change’ 16 June 2008 < 
https://www3.amherst.edu/~cgkingston/Comparing.pdf > accessed 18 October 2011. 
90 R.E. Goodin, The Theory of Institutional Design (CUP, Cambridge 1996). See Chapter 1 ‘Institutions and 
Their Design’. 
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will be considered in turn in order to gain a full understanding of the term ‘institution’: firstly, 
in the abstract but ultimately in the context of judicial institutions. 
 
Institutional design 
There are many different approaches to understanding what is meant by the term 'institution'. 
The overarching theme of these approaches is that they seek to explain '...observed 
regularities in the patterns of human behaviour' which collectively indicate institutional 
design.91 This discussion will set out two main approaches, of which there are recognised 
variations: institutions as rules (and norms) and institutions as equilibria. Institutions as rules 
are those which exist due to patterns of behaviour guided by rules; those involved follow the 
same norms of behaviour as a result and thus create an institution with a specific function or 
purpose. On the other hand, it may be that while the rule sets out the expected behaviour or 
norm, it is, in fact, the expectation of compliance with those rules which leads to an equilibria 
of behaviour which forms an institution. The equilibria of behaviour is created by ‘mutually 
understood actor expectations’ by those involved in the institution on how the institution 
should operate.92 Grief and Kingston discuss the two approaches and state that institutions as 
rules and institutions as equilibria are, '...best viewed as complements rather than 
substitutes.'93  
 
The rules which may form an institution were described by North as, 'the rules of the game in 
society'.94 These rules may firstly establish the institution and subsequently govern how it 
                                                        
91 S.E.S. Crawford & E. Ostrom, ‘A Grammar of Institutions’ (1995) American Political Science Review, Vol 
89, 582. 
92 Ibid., page 583 
93 A Grief & C Kingston, 'Institutions: rules or equilibria?' in N Schofield & G Caballero, Political economy of 
Institutions, Democracy and Voting (Springer, New York 2011). 
94 D North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP, Cambridge 1990) p3. 
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functions. This approach comprises both formal rules and more informal norms of behaviours. 
According to North, the formal rules are created by those in power, intentionally and for a 
specific purpose or purposes and may take the form of constitutions or laws. The informal 
rules are borne out of the society's norms and values and can be best described as the culture 
of that society.95 These informal rules may be expected standards of behaviour, codes of 
conduct or, in a legal setting, conventions or legislation. For example, Section 3 of the CRA 
2005, is the legislative provision for ensuring judicial independence (the formal rule). As can 
be seen from the example above, when assessing whether the institution is designed by rules, 
formal or informal, it is possible to identify the relevant law or convention which applies to 
the institution in question.  
 
The other approach to understanding institutions is viewing institutions as equilibria. This 
understanding focuses more on the motivation behind the adherence to such rules or norms. 
The manner in which 'purposeful agents' interact within an institution creates an expected 
standard of behaviour.96 The expectation of such behaviour in turn motivates an adherence to 
it by other actors within the institution and thus, perpetuates interaction in that way creating 
equilibrium. The purposeful agents, to borrow the term from political science, are those who 
are actively involved in the functions of the institution. The rule of law states the need for an 
independent judiciary and as such, it is expected that judges make decisions based on the facts 
of a case, free from interference or pressure. A respect for the principle of judicial 
independence and a fear of repercussions may also result in effective and balanced decision-
making. This drive for such independence, and knowledge of the constitutional importance of 
securing such independence, is what motivates the continuing behaviour of judges, politicians 
                                                        
95Ibid., at p37. 
96 M Setterfield, Interactions in Analytical Political Economy: Theory, Policy and Applications (M.E.Sharpe, 
New York 2005). 
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and those involved in the administration of justice to uphold the rule of law. The introduction 
of the Section 3 requirement as a formal rule may allow the institution to meet these 
requirements through its design; however, it could be suggested that the expected equilibrium 
is what protects the independence. It can be argued that this expectation of an institution as 
equilibria is not sufficient to protect the aforementioned independence but it may be able to 
explain how judicial institutions have come about to function in an independent manner prior 
to the introduction of the CRA 2005. Such an approach is useful; however, the notion of a 
specific and shared motivation of all institutional actors is complex and difficult to 
demonstrate. Institutional design is analysed in order to begin to identify the intentions behind 
an institution’s creation and lead on to further analysis of its intended purpose. 
 
Institutional purpose 
There are two main aspects of institutional purpose which will be considered here: a grammar 
of institution which offers an ‘institutional statement’ and a comparative discussion of the 
nature and type of institutions; specifically in the context of judicial institutions. 
 
Crawford and Ostrom offer a grammar, or language, of institutions as a means of clarifying 
the arguments and theories which discuss institutions as equilibria and institutions as rules 
and reasons why they may change; generally adding to the final ‘picture’ of the institution in 
which the design and purpose may become clear.97 Crawford and Ostrom use the term 
'institutional statement' to encompass these approaches.98 The statement, '...refers to a shared 
linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits or advises actions or outcomes for 
                                                        
97 S.E.S. Crawford & E. Ostrom, ‘A Grammar of Institutions’ (1995) American Political Science Review, Vol 
89, 582, 600. 
98 Ibid., p583. 
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actors' and is applicable to both individual actors and the institution as a whole.99 These 
institutional statements are useful when contextually analysing a specific institution to obtain 
information about its main purpose and functions.  There are five dimensions set out by 
Crawford and Ostrom: firstly, ‘Attribute’ which shows who is the target of that institution; 
secondly, ‘Deontic’ which describes whether the action, the various functions of the 
institution, may be done, must be done or must not be done; thirdly, the ‘Aim’ is what the 
action or functions should achieve, to which the ‘Deontic’ applies; fourthly, the ‘Conditions’ 
describe when, where and how much the ‘Aim’ is permitted, obligatory or forbidden; and 
lastly, the ‘Or Else’ dimension which identifies consequences should a rule not be 
followed.100 In order to apply this theory to judicial institutions, it is necessary to reduce the 
idea of a court to an idealized archetype. Michael Shapiro describes four ‘propositions’ which 
are often used to define a ‘conventional prototype’ of a court: ‘…independence, 
adversariness, decision according to precedent and “winner takes all” decisions.’101 Shapiro 
argues that such a rigid application of the archetypal court is wrong as it does not, in fact, 
describe the functions of many courts.102 However, this idealized archetype will be used here 
to see the grammar of institutions theory in practice as it will bring simplicity to a fairly 
abstract notion.  
 
The first dimension, ‘Attribute’ asks who the target of the institution is. In the case of the 
archetypal court, the principal actors are the judges and judicial staff and the individuals 
seeking to resolve a dispute, for example, an individual or the State in a civil or criminal 
                                                        
99 Ibid., p583. 
100 A Hertier, Explaining Institutional Change in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2007) p5.  
101 M Shapiro, Courts: a comparative and political analysis (University of Chicago, London 1981) p1. 
102 Shapiro goes on to state that such a simplistic archetype can easily be challenged by the social control and law 
making aspects of the judicial function.  
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proceedings.103 The second dimension, ‘Deontic’ looks at how pertinent the action, or 
function, required might be; in the case of a court and a claimant seeking resolution the 
archetypal court's primary function is to reach a decision based on the facts of the case (as 
Shapiro mentions, such functions are additional when considering social control or law-
making functions of courts).104 The action of providing a judgment must be done; this is 
where independence should be demonstrated and clearly seen. The third dimension offers the 
expansion of this second element in which the ‘Aim’ of that decision is made clear. When 
undertaking court proceedings, the decision will be given and a remedy suggested by the 
judge. The remedy may take a number of forms but this can be identified as the ultimate aim 
of the institution, regardless of the type of case. For example, the remedy may be damages in 
a civil case, it may be indictment of an individual responsible for a crime or, in a judicial 
review hearing, it may be to make a declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 if a statute is deemed to be in contravention of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The fourth dimension, ‘Conditions’ relate to how the ‘Aim’ is performed. In the case 
of a court, the conditions may prescribe who can apply for proceedings and to which court 
and by which means. For example, the appeal process within the UK. A personal injury 
claimant can not apply straight to the UKSC. A Magistrate’s Court must make a decision and 
the appeal process should be followed if a claimant wished to challenge the decision. The 
final dimension, the ‘Or Else’ element, identifies what happens if a court did not follow that 
procedure.  
 
The nature of the institution relates to its services and functions, and latterly its aims and 
strategies. Therefore if it is a court, for example, then it offers services in terms of trials, 
                                                        
103Other litigants may include corporations or unincorporated associations. The examples given is not an 
exhaustive list. 
104 M Shapiro, Courts: a comparative and political analysis (University of Chicago, London 1981) p1. 
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hearings and also as a part of the judicial system working alongside the police force to reduce 
crime and to rehabilitate offenders through correct sentencing. The nature of the institution is 
a descriptive element providing information about the work of the institution. Clarification 
can be given by labeling the nature of the institution, i.e. educational or judicial, public sector 
or private sector. Labeling the type of institution is the secondary point for gaining a clear 
understanding of the institution under scrutiny. The ‘type’ facet of the definition offers clarity 
when looking at the institution’s purpose before applying any of the theory above. In the case 
of judicial institutions in the UK, there are a number of different types of court. The type of 
court will affect which cases can be heard, for example, the Chancery Division of the High 
Court would not hear matters relating to divorce proceedings. The place of the court within 
the overall court structure will also affect which cases can be heard. Another example would 
be the Supreme Court, which will only hear appeals from the High Court or the Court of 
Appeal; proceedings to do not begin in the Supreme Court. A point of note here relates to the 
individual courts and the types of legal questions they are faced with. The Supreme Court will 
be hearing complex and challenging matters of public importance therefore the need for 
institutional autonomy is greater than for magistrate's or crown courts which are hearing 
questions of fact. Thus, it is necessary to ascertain the nature and type of the court in order to 
assess the level of institutional autonomy required. A clear notion of the court's type is 
particularly useful when applying the three main requirements of institutional autonomy, as 
will be seen later in this chapter. 
 
Institutional change 
These approaches to discovering the purpose of an institution and the focus on the design of 
an institution, through equilibrium and the creation of rules and norms, do not result in the 
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formation of the perfect institution; there may still be issues in carrying out the intended 
function or functions of the institution in question. A third aspect of institutions which is 
considered by political scientists is how institutions change and what drives them to do so. 
The common perspectives are that there is: a spontaneous evolution, a deliberate design or a 
product of both.105 F. A. Hayek, furthers the understanding of institutional change through 
spontaneous evolution. He discusses two different types of institution: a ‘made’ order (taxis) 
and a ‘spontaneous’ order (kosmos). The distinction is whether the institution has been 
designed, or whether it has evolved through practice and repetition of behaviours to be 
recognised as an institution. This echoes the previous discussion in terms of institutions as 
rules and institutions as equilibria.  
 
Spontaneous evolution relates to more informal rules and practice which develop over a long 
period of time and subsequently govern the behaviour of the institution and its actors.106 In a 
constitutional context, this type of informal rule is perhaps best illustrated by constitutional 
conventions. Quite often, where there is no explicit statutory provision on a matter, 
convention will develop to guide behaviour.107 Much of Hayek’s work focuses on types of 
economy. He identifies a free market economy as an example of a spontaneous order, arguing 
that it provides a more efficient allocation of societal resources than a strategy specifically 
designed by individual actors.108 The nature of a supply and demand relationship between 
actors in a free market economy results in an organic evolution of a system which is 
                                                        
105 C Kingston & G Caballero, 'Comparing theories of institutional change' (2009) Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 151. 
106  A Hertier, Explaining Institutional Change in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2007). Héritier explains, in detail, the 
varying process of institutional change and the effect this then has on the institutions in question. 
107 See discussion in Chapter 3 regarding the relationship between the President of the Supreme Court and the 
Chief Executive. 
108 C Petsoulas, Hayek's Liberalism and Its Origins: His Idea of Spontaneous Order and the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought, 2001) p2. 
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dependent on both demand for a product or service and competition. This idea can be 
identified in a constitutional context in terms of areas where conventions develop to govern 
interaction between institutions or actors. In a court setting, where there is no legislative 
provision governing the relationship between actors, such as a judge and a clerk, convention 
may develop should a conflict of interest arise, for example. The evolution of convention is an 
example of change through evolution, rather than planned design. In relation to courts, this 
may 
 
The process of institutional change by deliberate design revisits Hayek’s ‘made’ order.109 This 
intentional change is designed on a large scale for a specific purpose. In a political context, 
this may be the process of reform, which often results in the creation of new agencies or 
bodies. Once this major change occurs, smaller, incremental changes occur to achieve 
stability in the functioning of that institution. On the other hand, it may be difficult to clearly 
label the institutional change as one of deliberate design or solely the process of evolution. It 
may be more appropriate to consider that there is an element of both to be seen in the changes 
which occur. This may be that a statute sets out specific provision for the creation of a new 
institution, but it is difficult to govern on the more detailed interactions of that institution and 
its actors with other institutions without the gift of foresight. Therefore, convention will often 
develop when a matter requires governance not provided by statute and thus, there exists 
deliberate rules supported by informal conventions. 
 
                                                        
109 Ibid.  
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The suggestion is that theories of institutional change such as these offer an alternative, richer, 
perspective from which to view recent constitutional reforms in the UK.110 The creation of 
new institutions under the CRA 2005 would appear to be the product of deliberate design 
based on a review of previous interactions between main actors. The Judicial Appointments 
Commission, the changes to the office of Lord Chancellor and the creation of the Supreme 
Court are all set out by the 2005 Act and respond to various demands for improvement. 
However, it is difficult to argue that there has been change through deliberate design  if one 
considers, for example, the history of the changes to the judicial appointments process where 
the Lord Chancellor had altered the process prior to the CRA 2005. In fact, many of the 
reforms contained in the CRA 2005 were not conceptually new; these institutions were 
formed as a response to changes in practice or behaviour in the pre-existing institutions.111 It 
has been seen that those new institutions, as well as pre-existing institutions, have evolved 
and are developing new rules to govern interactions; largely in areas where the CRA 2005 
does not legislate.  
 
Regardless of research, there is not a singular, uniform definition of institutions. The 
approaches discussed here do overlap and require careful application to judicial institutions; 
their individual functions and purpose differing from the simplistic archetype which is often 
referred to. Identifying the institutional design and purpose can, in turn, help to explain the 
existence of any institutional change which takes place. Crawford and Ostrom's discussion of 
institutional statements offers a method for ascertaining the nature of specific judicial 
institutions and their main functions. An assessment of the institutional design and purpose of 
                                                        
110A Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: lessons from Medieval trade (CUP, Cambridge 
2006), p158.  
111 The arguments set out in Chapter 1 relating to the need for constitutional reform and the aims of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 show the areas in which the changes in practice, over a number of years, could 
be argued to be evolutionary thus inciting institutional change. 
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the court and a note of any institutional change which has taken place – spontaneous or 
deliberate- will enrich the picture of the institution’s current levels of autonomy. The 
discussion has considered the term 'autonomy' in a different context, moving away from 
literature in other areas of law; the discussions of institutional design and change may show 
how an institution evolves according to the need for change, whether it be deliberate or 
otherwise; and this, in turn, can establish the motivation and purpose behind that institution.  
 
Conclusions made as to the motivation and purpose behind a particular institution's 
development are not the end of the discussion of institutions. In order for an institution to 
demonstrate autonomy, more information is required. Information such as the  financing and 
organisation of the institution and the freedom the institution has in fulfilling its purpose must 
also be obtained. The means for doing this is considered next.  
 
Autonomy and self-determination 
In its most basic sense, self-determination is the right or ability that an individual has to make 
decisions about his or her own life. The notion of autonomy in any case relates to choice; the 
choices available to an individual and that individual’s ability to make them free from 
coercion. Expanding on that, self-determination is the free choice of one’s own acts without 
external compulsion. In a political context, self-determination is seen as the freedom of the 
people of a given territory to determine their own political status and how they will be 
governed, without any undue influence from any other country. This has clear links to the 
current discussion of institutional autonomy stating the right to govern, or operate, free from 
unnecessary interference from others. While an individual, or even societal, perspective is 
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useful it is important to understand autonomy and self-determination from an institutional 
perspective: more importantly, how it applies to a judicial institution.  
 
In taking judicial office, a judge will be sworn in and take two oaths, one of which states: “I 
will do right by all manner of people, after the law and usages of this realm, without fear or 
favour, affection or ill will.”112 This oath, or collective allegiance to judicial office, dates back 
to the Magna Carta in 1215 and is an acknowledgment by individual judges of the collective 
aim of their role within the judicial system. However, a judicial institution that receives no 
guidance and operates free from any constraints when acting in its capacity as a court is by no 
means desirable. As stated by Seidman, nobody would want a court to have that level of 
independence or, ‘…freedom to decide a case as the court sees fit without any constraint, 
exogenous or endogenous, actual or prospective’ as it would prevent any system of 
monitoring the behavior of the courts and the decisions taken.113 As Burbank and Friedman 
state, ‘Courts are institutions run by human beings. Human beings are subject to selfish or 
venal motives’ and as such, it is important that all those involved in the institution hold a 
collective belief as to the core functions.114 The judicial oath provides a basis from which 
individual institutions may build up a more detailed objective. This need for a common 
objective and collective belief is seemingly more important if the ideas held by American 
Legal Realists, are to be given note. It is unlikely that any lawyer would argue that a judge 
can be entirely impartial to an issue but this is why judges are expected to step down from a 
                                                        
112 The second oath is an affirmation of allegiance to Crown. Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘Oaths’ 2011 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/introduction-to-justice-system/oaths#headingAnchor1> 
accessed 11 April 2011. 
113 Seidman, L.M.’The impossibility of judicial independence’ 2001, paper presented at a conference sponsored 
by the American Judicature Society and the Brennan Center for Justice, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, PA..Referenced in S Burbank and B Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: an 
interdisciplinary approach (Sage Publications, California 2002) ‘Reconsidering Judicial Independence’ pp 11, 
12. 
114  Ibid., at page 12. 
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case should they have any persona interest in proceedings. The case of Lord Hoffman in the 
Pinochet case is a prime example of this.115 While autonomy is desirable for the overarching 
institution, individual actors (judges) must subscribe to the collective belief of the 
organisation. The judicial oath and the established practice of the judiciary could be held as 
the collective belief and any behaviour deviating from this could be seen as a type of 
unnecessary interference with the collective belief in carrying out the core functions. 
 
While any institutions will have inextricable links to an higher authority, as will be seen 
shortly, in determining whether institutional autonomy exists, and on what level, it is 
necessary to look at whether the institution can carry out its core functions with the required 
degree of autonomy or whether unnecessary constraints are placed upon it.  
 
 
Requisite elements of effective institutional autonomy 
There are three main elements of the notion of institutional autonomy that are put forward 
here. These elements have been developed to cover all aspects of an institution’s functions 
and, as we shall see, offer guidance when we are determining whether the level of 
independence of a given institution is sufficient to secure autonomy.  
 
Budgetary freedom 
The first aspect of institutional autonomy is budgetary freedom. The funding and allocation of 
budgets is, on the whole, fundamental to any institution and must be a primary consideration 
in any discussion of this nature; the importance of understanding the specific details of an 
                                                        
115 R v. New Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex. p. Pinochet Ugarte [1998] 4 All ER 89 (HL). The facts of this 
case and their relevance to the thesis are discussed in Chapter 1. 
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institution’s fiscal arrangements is that a decision on whether or not that institution could be 
seen to be autonomous can be reached once the other essential requirements are considered. 
The relevance of this budgetary freedom will differ depending on the nature and purpose of a 
specific institution. Decisions relating to funding can dictate the success of an institution in 
fulfilling its intended purpose, but who makes those decisions can give a reasonably clear 
indication of whether or not there was an intention to create a degree of institutional 
autonomy. 
 
The starting point when determining whether or not an institution has budgetary freedom is to 
look closely at their financial arrangements:  
 
 Where does the money come from;  
 Who decides the budget; and  
 How much freedom does the institution have when allocating resources, or 
spending money?  
 
It can be said that almost every business must have some sort of financial links with other 
businesses in order to exist. Daintith and Page acknowledge the linking nature of finance and 
how it creates “an interdependence” between businesses linked by some common purpose.116 
This common purpose may only be the fact that one wishes to buy the other’s product; or it 
could be that the businesses are part of a franchise and depend on each other’s success to be 
successful themselves. More relevant for these purposes, the institutions could be working 
together within a system of government. Daintith and Page also state that any business that 
wishes to function successfully in a financial market must have links with a “financial firm” 
                                                        
116 T Daintith and A Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and Internal Control (OUP, 
Oxford 1999) p3.  
~ 49 ~ 
 
 
and make well-informed judgements in relation to investments and other financial issues.117 
In the broadest sense, a financial firm may be a bank or any trading firm. Applied to a judicial 
institution such as the UKSC, the ‘financial firm’ in question is the executive government.118 
The interdependence of the three main branches of government demonstrates how each is 
reliant on the other to monitor and regulate behaviour. The system of checks and balances 
does not only relate to conduct and powers, but also to financial provision. While 
interdependency of this nature would appear feasible, and even necessary, the institutions 
involved must be afforded the necessary freedom and autonomy in carrying out their main 
functions.119  
 
It is important here to make the distinction between an institution’s core and non-core 
functions. This is useful when looking at the financial arrangements and any powers the 
institution has to allocate the budget. If an institution has the freedom to decide how to 
allocate the budget in relation to its core functions, it would suggest a higher level of 
institutional autonomy. In the previous section discussing political science approaches, 
Crawford and Ostrom made reference to broad and narrow prescriptions. This was then 
applied to the UKSC using the term ‘function’. Core functions are the functions the institution 
must perform in order to be a viable institution and fulfil the purpose of its design. This 
relates to the ‘Attribute’, ‘Deontic’ and ‘Aim’ dimensions of Crawford and Ostrom’s theory 
and a decision about the type and nature of the institution can further explain what the core 
functions would be expected to be. In the case of a court, the core functions are to hear cases 
impartially and offer remedies. More specifically, in the case of the UKSC it is possible to 
                                                        
117 Ibid.  at page 2. 
118 T Daintith and A Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and Internal Control (OUP, 
Oxford 1999) p4, 5.  
119 Ibid. 
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look at the Government papers and debate prior to the commencement of the CRA 2005 for 
specific expectations. Non-core functions may relate to issues such as judges giving speeches 
at conferences or dinners. The recent television documentary on BBC Four about the UKSC 
could be classed as a non-core function of the Justices, but this does not make it unnecessary. 
Such an act of transparency is exactly what the reforms have striven for; that the public can 
begin to see and take interest in proceedings of the justice system. These core and non-core 
functions will be discussed in the following sections. But what is it that makes an institution 
have enough budgetary freedom to qualify as manifesting institutional autonomy? It is 
important to look at the following questions in some detail. 
 
Provision of finance 
Firstly, where does the money come from?  
 
A high level of financial autonomy would be demonstrated by an institution that could create 
enough turn-over annually to enable them to fund their entire budget for the following year 
themselves and not be reliant on any other agent for the provision of finance. That level of 
financial independence is unlikely and it will be presumed here that the institution’s funding 
comes from elsewhere. The provision of finance usually occurs when a new institution 
requires financial backing to start-up, or when an existing institution requires finance in order 
to develop and grow into a successful enterprise; an annual budget is a prime example. This 
budgetary provision may take the form of loans or grants or may even result from sponsorship 
by another company but could also be contributed to from the net profit of the institution. 
Every institution whatever its type will rely on external funding, whether it is through 
payment for the provision of their services/product or whether it is from, for example, a 
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government department as a result of a Spending Review.  Public sector institutions such as 
courts, which receive funding from government departments are ultimately being paid for 
through taxation. Individual taxpayers do not, generally, get involved in the management 
decisions judicial institutions which may, on the face of it, seem a positive implication for 
institutional autonomy. The government institution, the Treasury, which provides the funding 
may, however, have an impact on decision-making of the court should it, for example, limit 
funding..  If a private sector institution, such as a bank, were to provide funding or invest in 
an institution, it is unlikely that the same level of autonomy can be achieved. By investing 
money into the core functions of that institution, the funding institution would have taken a 
level of risk. Therefore, it would be important for them to make a return on that investment 
through the success of the institution. It would seem reasonable in this situation for a 
company to retain a certain level of control over the expenditure of the funding; immediately 
having repercussions for the level of institutional autonomy.  
 
This first question aids an understanding of the fiscal arrangements but it does not dictate 
whether or not there is institutional autonomy as a result as every institution relies on funds 
coming from somewhere. The issue is at what level the budget is decided and what approval 
process is in place; awareness of the range of decision-making powers that an institution has 
will be important in deciding whether or not institutional autonomy exists. 
 
Responsibility for budgeting 
Secondly, there is the question of who is responsible for the budget for that institution. The 
spending review from the previous year will guide the process of deciding what the budget is, 
in terms of amount and more importantly, it should be decided by the institution itself and not 
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be wholly reliant on any other institution or agent for direction. This will mean that the 
institution, such as a court, should have a designated officer for finance who makes such 
decisions with their team, such as a Chief Executive or President. It would seem reasonable to 
expect some sort of safeguarding and committee-based work when deciding budgets. An 
institution may have sufficient autonomy to decide what money it needs and how that money 
may be spent. It would, however, take an extremely responsible system of management in 
order to prevent any abuse of that budget. A budget of, for example, £20,000 per annum may 
seem reasonable on the face of it unless that £20,000 is to pay for lavish holidays. Therefore, 
a committee stage of the budgeting process will mean that the allocation of the estimate will 
be vetted and approved. On the inclusion of a committee stage, it would be necessary to 
assess how much influence that committee has on decision-making. In the case of a court 
receiving finance from the Treasury, as per the earlier example,  the Treasury solely regulates 
the decisions made by the court to ensure they are satisfied with the budgetary process it is 
unlikely to reduce the autonomy of the court as it is acting in a regulatory capacity. If the 
Treasury had the power to limit or veto a budget request then it could be argued that there is 
little autonomy for the court as another authority has a say over whether or not they can have 
the money they require. The committee element should merely act as a system of checking 
that the budget is reasonable and attainable if the institution is intended to have a good level 
of autonomy.  
 
Allocation of resources 
A further analysis of this comes when considering the freedom an institution has in relation to 
the allocation of the resources- the final element in this discussion of budgetary freedom. This 
is hugely significant in deciding whether or not there is institutional autonomy as the 
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allocation of resources has been the primary consideration in Government spending reviews 
up until very recently.120 The allocation of resources is the main financial decision-making of 
any institution and a focused approach is needed when considering this in relation to a 
specific institution. For the purposes of institutional autonomy, in all contexts judicial or 
otherwise, the institution should have freedom in certain aspects. The following list shows the 
freedoms expected, plus an example of their application to judicial institutions. There should 
be freedom to allocate resources in the following areas: employees’ salaries (the payment of 
court staff and judges), any equipment necessary for the provision of services which will 
include the administration of the institution (computers or courtroom furniture, for example). 
It may also include: funds for any work to be sub-contracted; travel expenses of staff; the 
reasonable provision of food and drink. The allocation of funds to salaries and equipment 
must be decided and made by the institution if there is to be a high level of institutional 
autonomy. The other, supplementary, requirements may make the case for institutional 
autonomy stronger should it be argued at any time. However, the powers for decision-making 
in relation to the allocation of resources must lie with the institution. 
 
It is here that the core and non-core functions become relevant, as the allocation of resources 
to core functions should be able to be done freely and without restrictions placed upon it. This 
is required under the notion of institutional autonomy and, as will be seen later, can affect the 
level of institutional autonomy that exists. If there is restriction placed upon the allocation of 
resources toward non-core functions then it would be unlikely that this would significantly 
reduce the degree of institutional autonomy. In the case of a court, restrictions placed on 
                                                        
120 Since the general election in May 2010, the new coalition government has said that the October 2010 
Spending Review will, “consider new and radical approaches to public service provision” in an attempt to reduce 
the United Kingdom’s financial deficit. (HM Treasury, Spending Review Framework, Command Paper CM7872 
June 2010). 
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allocating resources to carry out casework, to pay judges and staff and to maintain a 
courthouse would be deemed to detrimentally affect the institution’s autonomy. It may not be 
a negative matter if the institution in question is not striving for greater independence. 
However, it would be seen as unfavourable for a court, more specifically the Supreme Court. 
 
 
Administrative freedom 
This second element in the notion of institutional autonomy is, in some respects, an extension 
of the budgetary freedom requirement with more specific analysis of some of the ideas raised. 
However, it is worthy of consideration in its own right as it ensures an in-depth evaluation of 
the day-to-day workings of an institution and helps to decide whether or not the institution is 
run in an independent fashion. As will be seen in the next chapter, a lack of freedom to 
administer an institution can have a significant and negative impact on an institution’s 
autonomy. 
 
The administration of justice operates on two levels: at the highest level, there is the 
administration of the judicial branch of government and how it works alongside the 
legislature and the executive. The wider courts system has developed and provides direction 
on all issues of the law and this system strives to be independent both at an institutional level 
in terms of the different courts but also at an individual level concerning the individual judges 
in deciding cases.121 The bodies which exist within the justice system have a range of 
important functions in the administration of, ‘…criminal, civil and family justice, democracy 
                                                        
121 The Administration of Justice Act 1970 ch.31 provides detail about the business, procedure and jurisdiction of 
all courts. 
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and rights, and… inspectorates and ombudsmen.’122 Such bodies include the Law 
Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the newly created Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals 
Service and the Court’s Funds Office. 
 
Facets of administrative freedom 
Administrative freedom covers a variety of aspects within an institution, including the work 
of the institution and its workforce. An important factor is whether or not the administration is 
independent in nature. The administrative freedom requirement is to include the provision of 
human resources and supporting administration, including: recruitment; training and 
development of workforce; monitoring behaviour and performance of workforce; developing 
the institution as an organisation; and other administration business. These are universal 
provisions which apply to any institution- judicial or non-judicial- although they will relate to 
the specific area in question. The basics of the human resource provision are deciding whether 
or not the institution can support itself and the activities of its workforce. For example, if a 
newly recruited trainee needs further development does that institution have the means to 
provide, or source, that training? Or if an employee has a problem regarding their pay, is there 
a payroll team to advise them? Supporting administration relates to the organisation of 
operations and the staff who ensure its successful completion.   
 
Administrative autonomy may also be demonstrated by an institution being proactive in its 
development and design, instead of waiting for guidance on future plans. An institution that 
does not take charge of its own growth must be considered as having a lower level of 
autonomy. The freedom that an administration has in implementing this process can aid the 
                                                        
122 Justice, ‘Organisations’ 27 September 2011 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/index.htm> accessed on 14 
October 2011. 
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decision regarding institutional autonomy: whether it exists and on what level. Part of this 
notion of development and design may relate to broad decisions about future aims of the 
institution but may be as specific as decision relating to the use of particular communication 
systems or the range services offered within that institution. An important aspect of 
administration is the communication between actors within the institution and with external 
contacts. There should be freedom both in the choice of systems used, and in the way in 
which they are used, on a daily basis. The services offered by an institution can relate directly 
to its core functions- the administration which allows a court to decide cases- or it could 
include support services such as catering. Consideration of such aspects of administration can 
show a true picture of the autonomy which exists. 
 
Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service oversees the administration of justice in courts in 
England and Wales.123 It operates as an agency of the Ministry of Justice and links with a 
number of government departments to ensure access to justice as far as is possible. This 
agency operates above the individual courts but below the main branches of government and 
partners the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals to 
oversee the administration of judicial institutions.124 The Judicial Office operates in five 
groups: Strategy, Communications and Governance; HR for the Judiciary; senior judicial 
support; Judicial College; and Corporate Services.125 The Judicial Office provides support for 
over 43,000 employees of judicial institutions in England and Wales.126 The office of the Lord 
Chief Justice gives guidance on executive matters affecting any judicial institution’s day-to-
                                                        
123 Justice, ‘Organisations: Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service’ 15 April 2011 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmcts/index.htm> accessed 21 April 2011. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘Judicial Office’ 2011 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/training-support/jo-
index> accessed 10 April 2011. 
126 Ibid. 
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day running in its capacity as a court; filtering information from Government to the individual 
institutions. While officially it is the Lord Chief Justice who provides direct management of 
judicial functions, through Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service the Ministry of 
Justice, a government department, may still be involved in the administration of justice. This 
may have large-scale implications for institutional autonomy and would need consideration 
when assessing the institutional autonomy of individual courts. 
 
Unnecessary interference 
An institution which has been able to demonstrate a good level of budgetary freedom through 
a consultation of various financial procedures and also a good level of freedom in the day-to-
day administration of functions must finally show what interference exists from third parties 
in order to complete the analysis of its institutional autonomy. This interference relates 
directly to the autonomy and self-determination of the institution and is, perhaps, the most 
complex yet important element of institutional autonomy. Autonomy and the ability to 
determine one’s own destiny (self-determination) not only relate to people but can also relate 
to institutions as well; if there is any interference that limits that self-determination then it 
would be fair to say that the autonomy is reduced. To build on the theory surrounding 
institutions, the equilibria of expectation is negatively affected if a judicial institution is 
subjected to unnecessary interference, from either internal or external sources. This 
interference would upset the balance of the actors and their actions within the institution. 
 
What is deemed unnecessary?  
It may be considered an ideal situation if an institution were able to function free from any 
external pressures or interference for its entire lifetime. This, however, is unlikely to be the 
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case in many cases. Most institutions welcome some kind of external involvement in 
decision-making processes, even if only in the form of advice and guidance, as this relieves 
the pressure of leaving the decision-making to be made entirely within the administration of 
the institution. The ability to make every decision may be beyond most institutions and would 
also rely on being wholly self-funded to avoid any input, or interference, from any other 
source. The pressure of making all decisions relating to budgets and administration would be 
an enormous pressure for even the strongest, most successful business. It may also be the case 
that an institution should not be allowed to function free from any interference due to 
convention and practice in that area. One example of an institution that requires constant 
interference is Parliament. It would never be desirable for a parliament to operate free from 
any external pressures as any external pressure acts as a system of monitoring the operations 
and behaviour of an institution. The UK constitution, through its principle of a separation of 
powers, encourages a system of checks and balances to monitor the functioning and behaviour 
of the three main branches and can help to determine what interference has occurred and 
whether or not it is unnecessary. Roger Masterman describes the doctrine as: a tool of 
institutional design, a system of checks and balances, and as a mechanism by which to ensure 
governmental efficiency.127 He goes on to state how, ‘the notion of judicial independence – 
for so long a tool designed to ensure the fairness of individual proceedings – has begun to 
take on an institutional dynamic more in keeping with the notion of the judiciary as an 
autonomous, or third, branch of government.128 This summary of the objectives of the 
separation of powers doctrine demonstrates that there is a will, more so since the 
Constitutional Reform Act’s enactment, to ensure that judicial institutions can operate with 
the degree of autonomy required to secure judicial independence. Such a degree of autonomy 
                                                        
127 Roger Masterman, ‘The Form and Substance of the United Kingdom’s Separation of Powers’ Speech at the 
British Politics Group conference, 1 September 2010 at page 1. 
128 Ibid., at page 3. 
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may be reduced in relation to finance or administration, but it can be significantly reduced if 
there is unnecessary interference preventing the institution fulfilling its intended purpose.  
 
In determining what is meant by unnecessary interference, it is perhaps easier to firstly 
consider what interference, or aid, is considered necessary. Such situations may include: when 
the financial need dictates; or in order to implement new measures or develop the institution 
in some way. These situations may dictate whether interference is necessary but ultimately, 
the decision to request interference from another source lies with the institution. Therefore, 
the ideas surrounding unnecessary interference largely centre on the idea of an institution 
requesting help. If an institution requests help for any reason, then institutional autonomy is 
not, immediately, affected, as it is the institution taking the action. If, however, the request for 
help is made by an external source and that help is provided without any input from the 
institution then this may well reduce the institutional autonomy, as the institution is a passive 
actor in the process. Therefore, if the institution has not requested help, or interference, but it 
is given then that could be classed as unnecessary interference.  
 
In light of this, certain situations may arise where the interference requested is not deemed 
unnecessary. Firstly, if the financial situation of the institution dictates the need for help: for 
example, if an institution had exhausted its funds and needed some sort of loan from a bank in 
order to continue operations, then it is unlikely that it would be argued to be unnecessary 
interference as it has been requested. This may arise due to a problem with the funding 
process. The courts in England and Wales are funded like any other government department 
as a part of the Ministry of Justice and await a budget determined by Spending Reviews. This 
reliance on Government decision-making reduces the level of institutional autonomy. Due to 
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the wide-ranging cuts to funding across the public sector, financial issues have come under 
significant scrutiny. The reduction of a budget due to Government spending cuts is an 
example of when this type of interference is unnecessary, and detrimental to the degree of 
institutional autonomy that may be achieved. Secondly, in any emergency situation consent to 
be given aid is presumed. This could apply on an institutional level if there is some need for 
crisis management within the institution.129 The idea of crisis management does link to the 
third situation when interference may be necessary: that there are new measures to be 
implemented or the institution needs some sort of development. It has been said that a crisis 
occurs due to the old operating system being unable to cope with an event, requiring some 
type of development to cope in the future.130 It could be said here that such a crisis may occur 
internally within the institution, or within the wider framework in which it sits. In the case of 
judicial institutions there may be a change to the policy of how cases are reported due to 
negative consequences of media coverage of the court's work; this internal change may be 
deemed necessary. Or it may be at a time when there is significant constitutional change, 
possibly because of a 'constitutional moment'.131  
 
Specifically related to judicial institutions, an additional situation when interference is 
deemed to be necessary arises if the office of the Lord Chief Justice gives guidance on 
executive matters affecting any judicial institution’s day-to-day running in its capacity as a 
court. This statement is assuming that the Lord Chief Justice will always have the institution’s 
best interests at heart, which may not necessarily be the case. The role of the Lord Chief 
Justice in relation to judicial institutions will be discussed below in the section on external 
                                                        
129 Crisis management may be needed as a result of some unexpected event that affects employees, stakeholders 
or the general public. 
130 Julie M. Novak and Timothy L. Sellnow, “Reducing Organizational Risk through Participatory 
Communication” (2009) Journal of Applied Communication Research 349, 373. 
131 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009). 
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versus internal interference. As will be seen in Chapter 3, there are some notable examples of 
the type of interference that is deemed to be unnecessary specifically for judicial institutions. 
Under the CRA 2005, section 3 makes a declaration to guarantee the independence of the 
judiciary. The means for ensuring this independence is to avoid unnecessary interference with 
the core functions of judicial institutions. If there were to be criticism of a judge’s decision 
made by a Government minister, for example, then this could be said to undermine the level 
of institutional autonomy that the court enjoyed.  
 
Hierarchy of authority 
In any societal situation there is some degree of ‘hierarchy of authority’ amongst the main 
actors.132 For example, a police constable patrolling the street can make an arrest, but he/she 
must take any orders from his Chief Inspector on the circumstances of that arrest due to an 
established hierarchy of authority. Identifying the hierarchy of authority for an institution 
could be useful in seeing where the interference is coming from and whether or not it is 
reasonable. If it is coming from a source with greater authority and does not contradict any 
legislation or guidance that gives the institution powers, then it would most likely be 
acceptable. Interference from a higher authority may affect the level of institutional autonomy 
depending on what the interference is. If it falls into one of the three, aforementioned 
situations then there should be little effect on the autonomy of the institution. However, if the 
interference was a piece of legislation that alters the powers given to the institution then this 
would significantly reduce the autonomy as there is little the institution can do to stop it 
happening. If the interference were coming from a body beneath the institution in the 
                                                        
132 S Burbank and B Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach 
(Sage Publications, California 2002).  
~ 62 ~ 
 
 
hierarchy of authority, it would be important to look closely at why that body was interfering 
and to what ends.  
 
For judicial institutions, and as stated above, even if the interfering agent is the Lord Chief 
Justice, their interference must be questioned. If the interference were to come from the 
executive branch of government, then that would need close inspection due to the basic 
principles of the rule of law and particularly the doctrine of separation of powers. It would be 
important to analyse the powers that the executive branch of government has and decide if 
there is any interference that jeopardises the existing, organised system of government. The 
executive should not, under most circumstances, be involved in any business of the judiciary 
and vice versa. This again reiterates the importance of the separation of powers in providing a 
means for securing institutional autonomy. This allows the branches of government to act 
independently from each other, helping to uphold the rule of law. It is here that the role of 
constitutional convention may arise. One such convention exists which states that the 
executive do not criticise the judiciary and vice versa. The adherence to this convention is one 
for debate, with instances of Home Secretaries failing to do so. As mentioned above, this is an 
important example of the type of unnecessary interference with which judicial institutions 
may be faced.  
 
From this it can be said that a certain level of interference, in the situations outlined 
previously, is in place as a system of monitoring the behaviour of an institution. When 
deciding whether or not a type of interference is unnecessary, the main points above can be 
used as a guide. As with all the elements of institutional autonomy, a degree of flexibility and 
a good knowledge of the institution should be used in applying them.  
~ 63 ~ 
 
 
Internal and external threats to institutional autonomy  
It is easy to assume that most threats to institutional autonomy would come from an external 
source and indeed, unnecessary interference could, legitimately, be called extraneous 
interference instead. However, there are occasions when the interference comes from within 
the institution whether it is on an individual level from an employee or more widely from 
within the sector that the institution operates that justifies the scope of the term ‘unnecessary’. 
The previous discussion of hierarchy of authority is again relevant when deciding whether the 
interference, if it is internal, is unnecessary. If the interference comes from the management of 
the institution in the form of a direction for improvement or development then it is unlikely to 
be seen as interference, more as guidance being provided from within the institution. 
However, should that direction become more of an order to carry out a specific task or 
function that the institution must follow due to the hierarchy of authority, the autonomy 
would be reduced. The example given above was if a piece of legislation changed the powers 
conferred on that institution, then the hierarchy of authority would suggest that there is little 
the institution could do to prevent the interference therefore reducing the level of institutional 
autonomy. Move this example to an internal situation, such as the management giving orders 
to the payroll department to freeze salaries and again there is little that department can do but 
follow the order. In the majority of situations, the internal interference will stem from some 
external factor (the freezing of pay may stem from a global recession) but it is important to 
consider this as a possible factor in reducing the level of institutional autonomy. Another 
situation of interference may arise in relation to a private investor being the funding source for 
the institution. If that investor retained a level of control over the investment he or she made, 
then from an internal perspective they could place unwanted pressure on the institution. 
Although the investor was, originally, an external source of funding for the institution, if the 
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institution allowed a continuing role in the development and financial business then that 
investor becomes an internal figure.  
 
Another form of internal interference could be said to come from the main actors within 
judicial institutions themselves. Political scientists have often claimed that judicial ideology 
decides cases not the law: that judges decide cases based on their own beliefs.133 Such claims 
stem from a reaction to the jurisprudential movement in 20th-Century America, American 
Legal Realism. The American Legal Realism movement argues that judges do not decide 
cases based on the law in terms of statutes and precedent but really due to what they, as 
judges, decide is “fair” on the facts of the case.134 These claims, if substantiated, could have 
notable repercussions in the debate surrounding judicial independence. The Realists suggest 
that an internal interference with that independence comes from judges’ own beliefs and not 
from external sources and pressures: pressures such as affiliations to political parties or 
pressures from a higher authority within the judiciary. Such claims must be investigated and 
further research into an area which demonstrates considerable knowledge of institutions- both 
judicial and non-judicial- should be made in order to provide a rounded approach to a 
reasonably abstract, and under-documented, notion as institutional autonomy. 
 
A topical example of internal interference would be to continue the previous discussion of the 
role of the Lord Chief Justice and his place within the judiciary. Having considerable power 
placed on him by the CRA 2005 as head of the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice would be 
well within his rights to ask a court, for example, to speed up the time it is taking for them to 
                                                        
133 For a brief discussion of these arguments see S Burbank and B Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the 
Crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach (Sage Publications, California 2002), pp 24, 26.  
134 Brain Leiter, ‘American Legal Realism’ – can be seen in W Edmundson & M Gloding (eds.), The Blackwell 
Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell, Oxford 2003). 
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hear cases to ensure the effective administration of justice. This guidance is an acceptable 
form of interference, as it does not alter the autonomy of that court. If, however, the Lord 
Chief Justice were to tell that court how to decide a particular case or which judge should hear 
it then this type of interference would produce the type of internal clash that may reduce the 
institutional autonomy for that judicial institution from an internal perspective. It is at this 
point that the factors concerning institutional design and purpose are relevant. Consideration 
of the formal rules (laws or policy) which govern the institution should be undertaken, as well 
as an assessment of any informal rules (such as conventions) which may have developed. This 
will enable a picture to be created of the institution’s purpose and whether the type of internal 
interference experienced is something which is governed by formal rules. If it has become a 
pattern of behaviour which has developed into an informal convention, it must still be 
analysed to decide if that informal convention is having a negative impact on the institution’s 
autonomy. Something to note at this point is that the Lord Chief Justice has no formal 
responsibilities toward the UKSC thus externalising the role in relation to interference and an 
important factor to remember in later discussions of the UKSC. 
 
An example of possible external interference for judicial institutions, now as such due to 
changes made by the CRA 2005, is the office of Lord Chancellor. While the Lord Chancellor 
still has responsibility to the judiciary, now enshrined in section 3 of the CRA 2005, the office 
itself has a different quality from that prior to the reforms. The Lord Chancellor is a Cabinet 
minister and also has the title Secretary of State for Justice.135 By placing ultimate 
responsibility for the judicial system with the Lord Chief Justice as Head of the Judiciary, it 
makes the separation of powers much clearer but has also made the Lord Chancellor external 
                                                        
135 United Kingdom Parliament, ‘The Lord Chancellor’ -- http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-
lords/principal/lord-chancellor/ accessed 10 September 2011. 
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to the UKSC and the judiciary as a whole. It is now more important than before that the 
actions of the Lord Chancellor are monitored and that any interaction with the judiciary is 
justified. A recent regulatory document Her Majesty’s Court Service mentions a possible 
partnership between the Minsitry of Justice and the Lord Chancellor. This could be classed as 
a new type of partnership between the judiciary and the office of Lord Chancellor and may 
result in ‘useful’ interference. For interference to be considered necessary, it would need to be 
seen that there was a consensus toward a similar objective. The actions should be motivated 
by the collective belief of the judiciary, not by the Executive.  
 
It is important to state that role of individual actors may alter dependent on the institution in 
question and therefore, their interference with one institution as opposed to another may be 
deemed necessary in one situation but unnecessary in another.  
 
 
Levels of institutional autonomy 
The notion of differing levels of institutional autonomy has been mentioned throughout this 
chapter; the intention is to convey that this is not a rigid concept, but a fluid notion of 
autonomy. This reiterates the main ideas of the political science approaches discussed earlier. 
It may be possible, on assessing the design and purpose of the institution in question, to 
analyse the intended level of autonomy. In the institutional design, it may be evident whether 
or not the institution is capable of functioning in an autonomous manner. 
 
In order to see how the levels of institutional autonomy might be applied, it is useful to 
consider the opposite: institutional autonomy on an absolute or non-absolute spectrum. Such a 
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spectrum suggests that either institutional autonomy exists or it does not. This may be clear in 
terms of arriving at a decision following the analysis of the three required elements, however, 
it is not helpful to applying the notion of institutional autonomy in the UK, as it should be 
viewed as a changeable situation. The other difficulty with viewing the notion on an absolute 
or non-absolute spectrum is the need for extremely detailed criteria which are easily 
measured. This is unlikely to be possible in an evolving constitution but equally it would not 
be helpful to the notion or to supporting the concept of judicial independence. Part of the role 
of institutional autonomy is to aid in assessing whether there is sufficient autonomy for a 
judicial institution and whether, in turn, there is sufficient collective judicial independence. 
By forming a conclusion as to the level of institutional autonomy, it enables a more accurate 
evaluation of whether it is sufficient or not. 
 
Below are diagrammatic examples of both scenarios, seeking to explain institutional 
autonomy in an absolute sense and comparatively, in terms of level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Absolute vs. Non-Absolute Spectrum 
 
 
Institutional autonomy exists      No institutional autonomy  
      exists 
 
Achieved as able to determine own      Budgetary freedom and     
budget and is able to administer      administrative freedom are not    
the core functions of the institution       secured due to unnecessary 
 free from any unnecessary     interference during the             
interference.       operation of core functions. 
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Figure 2. High and Low levels of Institutional Autonomy 
 
 
High level of Institutional 
autonomy exists 
 
High level of budgetary and 
administrative freedoms exist 
  and there is little or no 
unnecessary interference. 
 
 
Good level of institutional 
autonomy exists 
 
Good level of three main 
requirements; some 
unnecessary interference 
exists. 
 
 
Low level of institutional 
autonomy exists 
 
Low level of budgetary or 
administrative freedoms; 
high level of unnecessary 
interference exists. 
 
 
 
The strength of an institution’s institutional autonomy can be determined by application of 
Figure 2., something that is of far more use than Figure 1’s absolute or non-absolute 
spectrum. By showing to what level an institution has autonomy, assessment can be made of 
why that level has been achieved to begin with and how that level may be improved. The 
institution, or court, may use the strength of institutional autonomy to put a case forward 
against the current level of judicial independence. If institutional autonomy is weak, judicial 
independence is arguably weak as well. In addition to these diagrams, it must be said that the 
level of institutional autonomy may change depending on time and the institution. For 
example, when the Labour Government put the constitutional reforms into motion, the 
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country was enjoying something of an economic boom. Suggestions of such freedom in terms 
of budget for the Supreme Court, for example, were seen as viable and realistic when other 
institutions were too enjoying such autonomy. However, due to the recession and the number 
of cuts put in place in order to restore financial security in Britain, the Supreme Court is now 
finding such freedoms are not being realised.136 This would suggest that the role of finance is 
fundamental to the level of institutional autonomy. The idea that with access to more funding 
support an institution is likely to have greater freedom in terms of allocating resources and 
running its administration. Conversely, if there are limitations to funding, due to national or 
global factors, then it will no doubt be somewhat necessary for a higher authority to place 
limitations on the spending of institutions. This would not be limited to the judicial system, 
but this is something which would, and has, affected all number of institutions in a range of 
sectors, both public and private. Here it is necessary to reiterate the need to apply the notion 
of institutional autonomy in a critical way; it is context-dependent and is not, therefore, a 
notion which can be applied universally and indiscriminately.  
 
In this thesis, and in a wider application of institutional autonomy within the UK constitution, 
Figure 2 is to be applied. Institutional autonomy is intended to support the rule of law in 
ensuring judicial independence. Although, arguably, there should be a high level of 
institutional autonomy in order to do this, a good level is equally beneficial. Furthermore, a 
low level of institutional autonomy is similarly useful as it should provide a driving force to 
improving that level of institutional autonomy and thus improving the degree of judicial 
independence for that institution. Thorough understanding of budgetary freedom, 
administrative freedom and from where unnecessary interference comes will be needed to 
                                                        
136 Funding of the Supreme Court, both proposed and realised, is analysed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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identify which level of institutional autonomy is reached. As will be seen in the analysis of 
the UKSC in Chapter 3, a thorough analysis can be made of each of the requirements and a 
decision may be reached as to a judicial institution’s institutional autonomy and subsequently, 
its judicial independence.  
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CHAPTER 3 - INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM SUPREME COURT 
 
 
At a time of significant constitutional reform, there will always be suggestions for further 
development. The recognition of institutional autonomy is one such development. This 
chapter will discuss what institutional autonomy means within the context of the UK and 
critically analyse the intended (the proposals discussed for protection of judicial 
independence) and realised (the existing legislative provision for protection of judicial 
independence) degree of institutional autonomy that exists in relation to the UKSC. From this, 
it will be possible to draw conclusions as to the future of institutional autonomy within the 
constitutional arrangements of the UK. The recent constitutional reforms in the UK appear to 
demonstrate a drive to ensure the protection of judicial independence and to, more formally, 
insulate the judiciary from the executive and the legislature. Therefore, it is now timely to 
suggest a means of ensuring this protection still further: through the recognition and 
implementation of the notion of institutional autonomy.   
Lord Woolf stated prior to the enactment of the CRA 2005, the ‘judiciary was too exposed as 
arrangements stood’137 and while judicial independence is clearly a focus of the CRA 2005, 
there seems to have been a subtle disregard of the implications of the creation of the Supreme 
Court in relation to that constitutional principle. 138 The Ministry of Justice felt the creation of 
an independent Supreme Court would be a useful means to, ‘…[provide] greater clarity in our 
constitutional arrangements by further separating the judiciary from the legislature.’139 One 
                                                        
137 Lord Woolf, ‘The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution’ Squire Centenary Lecture, 3 March 2004 at 
Cambridge University. 
138 J Lennon, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: a note on early days’ (2010) CJQ 140,142. Jo Lennan 
gives examples of the apparent lack of acknowledgement for the fomalisation of judicial independence in the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and through the creation of the Supreme Court. 
139 Ministry of Justice, “The Supreme Court--Significance to the UK” (London: 2010), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/significance-to-the-uk.html [Accessed February 24 2011]. 
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part of the reason for this disregard may be due to the fact that any significant changes as a 
result of the formalisation of judicial autonomy in the Supreme Court may not be seen for 
many years, until an event requires the judicial independence, or institutional autonomy, of 
the court to be scrutinised.  
The explicit requirements of institutional autonomy for a judicial institution, as laid down by 
the previous chapter, will be applied to the UKSC, considering some relevant ‘test’ cases to 
discuss the importance and role of institutional autonomy.  The analysis will conclude to what 
degree institutional autonomy exists and whether or not the current degree is sufficient.  
 
Institutional autonomy and its impact in the United Kingdom  
The acknowledgment of institutional autonomy will inevitably impact on existing legislative 
protection of the autonomy and independence of judicial institutions, but first it is necessary 
to consider what form the existing protection takes and how effective it is. It can be clearly 
argued that the reforms are moving in the right direction to ensure greater protection for 
judicial independence, but recognition of the notion of institutional autonomy within the 
United Kingdom can further that desired level of protection. The statutory declaration of the 
protection of judicial independence in section 3 of the CRA 2005 is one of the first times that 
the principle of judicial independence has received statutory recognition; an important 
development but one which can still further the case for institutional autonomy. While its 
inclusion in statute is significant for the protection of judicial independence, little guidance is 
offered, as previously discussed, as to what form that protection would take.  
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The structural changes made to the office of Lord Chancellor as a result of the CRA 2005 
were major: by altering the role of Lord Chancellor to no longer cover all three branches of 
government, there was immediately an improvement on the separation of powers that 
previously existed. The constant, however, was the duty to uphold and protect the 
independence of the judiciary. At the time, it was not clear how the reformed role of the Lord 
Chancellor might ensure the protection of judicial independence but one aim was to reduce 
any unjustified response from Government on judicial decision-making. As was mentioned by 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, while the CRA 2005, and the Human 
Rights Act 1998, had created a more separate identity for the judicial branch of government, 
this would no doubt lead to tensions between the two branches of government.140 Professor 
Kate Malleson summarised the possible explanation for these increased tensions and how they 
came to fruition: due to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the CRA 2005, judges are required 
to, “…police constitutional boundaries and determine sensitive human rights issues” that 
would, previously, have been unimaginable.141 Charles Clarke, former Home Secretary 
acknowledge that the Human Rights Act 2005 has, ‘shifted the balance of power toward the 
judiciary’ and as a result, discussions needed to occur to re-evaluate the constitutional 
arrangements in place at that time.142 These developments document the current trend toward 
restructuring and reshaping institutional arrangements within the constitution and the move 
toward greater institutional autonomy for the final court of appeal in the UK. As is suggested, 
one main impact of institutional change was an increased tension, but it was felt by some that 
                                                        
140 House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07. 
141 House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 Appendix 3: A paper by 
Professor Kate Malleson, ‘The effect of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 on the relationship between the 
judiciary, the executive and Parliament’ A recent article by Professor Malleson for Public Law titled ‘The 
Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’ discusses these tensions in detail and the reasons for them. This will be 
addressed further in Chapter 4. 
142 House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07, at page 15, para. 32. This 
paragraph also recognises other academic acknowledgement of the shift in power and the increasing role of the 
judiciary. 
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this was not a problem and just an expected part of the working of government. Lord 
Bingham discussed the fact that while these tensions exist, and can be heightened at times of a 
threat to national security, they are, ‘inevitable, and in [his] view entirely proper’.143 The 
judicial consensus that tension is an inevitable, yet proper, by-product of any constitutional 
relationship did not match to the varying opinions of government and the press: Charles 
Clarke, in the same report, states that the tensions had highlighted matters which should be 
resolved in order for those relationships to be of benefit to the constitution. One newspaper 
editor documented ‘anxieties on the judicial side’- seemingly contrary to general judicial 
opinion on the matter at the time.144 It now becomes pertinent to note that the recognition of 
the notion of institutional autonomy should not result in a lack of prevention of any sort of 
interaction between the three branches of government, but that what interaction exists should, 
to use the words of Lord Bingham, be ‘entirely proper’.145  
At the time of the enactment of the CRA 2005, some observers were unsure how judicial 
independence should be protected under section 3. Lord Lloyd offered two aspects to the 
defence as he viewed it. The first was for the Lord Chancellor to raise concerns with the 
Cabinet if there is an attempt to restrict the jurisdiction of the courts. While the Lord 
Chancellor, as a result of the changes in legislation, is no longer the Head of the Judiciary, 
‘...it is essential that he should remain a jealous guardian of judicial independence in 
Cabinet.’146 The second aspect of defending judicial independence offered by Lord Lloyd is 
related to attacks made on individual judges by the government or external sources. This is, 
thankfully, not a common occurrence but one which has arisen and will, no doubt, continue to 
                                                        
143 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, "The Rule of Law" (2007) CLJ 67. 
144 Paul Dacre, editor of the Daily Mail giving information as a witness to the Select Committee on the 
Constitution’s 6th report- House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07, at 
page 16, para. 34. 
145 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, "The Rule of Law" (2007) CLJ 67. 
146 House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 at page 17, para. 39. 
~ 75 ~ 
 
 
do so; therefore a consideration of this element will be made - with specific and detailed 
reference to the Craig Sweeney case considered in the Select Committee on Constitution’s 
sixth report. The case is documented as the first real test of how the new relationship between 
the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary is working and the report considers the existing tensions 
between government actors at the time.147 Further to this second defence of judicial 
independence, in recent months it has become clear that the Lord Chancellor’s relationship 
with government ministers can even now impact on the perceived independence of the 
judiciary.   
 
Lord Falconer, in his role as Lord Chancellor in 2007, stated his duty under section 3 was to 
speak out privately, but publicly if necessary, against any attacks in order to defend the 
independence of the judiciary.148 On the face of it, this obligation appears to provide a 
reasonable degree of protection for judicial independence and uses the Lord Chancellor’s 
position within the Cabinet to the advantage of the judiciary in giving a necessary stage for 
debate of any concerns raised. There have been a few occasions where the Lord Chancellor 
has been forced to speak privately to  ministers regarding public attacks on the judiciary but 
the case of note relates to an occasion when the Lord Chancellor had to speak out publicly in 
order to defend the judiciary: the Craig Sweeney case.149 The events in question surrounded 
the government response, from then Home Secretary the Rt Hon John Reid MP, in relation to 
                                                        
147 AW Bradley, 'Relations between Executive, Judiciary and Parliament: an evolving saga?' (2008) PL 470, 489 
cites the case, and the response from government is heavily criticised in the Select Committee of the 
Constitution, 6th Report of Session 2006/07. 
148 House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 at page 18, para. 42. Lord 
Falconer provided evidence as a witness for this report in which he discussed the obligations he had in his role as 
Lord Chancellor. 
149 The Sixth Report of the House of Lords Select Committee documents two examples of attacks on the 
judiciary made within the public domain by David Blunkett MP and Michael Howard MP in 2003 and 1995 
respectively. See House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 at page 18, 
para. 44. 
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the sentence passed for convicted paedophile Craig Sweeney. Craig Sweeney was sentenced 
to life imprisonment after kidnapping and attacking a three-year old girl from her home in 
Cardiff on 3 January 2006. The judge, Cardiff Recorder John Griffiths QC, sentenced 
Sweeney to the minimum tariff of five years and 108 days and stated at the time that Sweeney 
could be eligible for early release but felt that this would be “unlikely”.150 The sentence was 
immediately attacked by the victim’s family as an insult; they felt that the criminal justice 
system had failed their daughter in adequately sentencing her attacker.151 The significance of 
this case lies in the differing response of various actors involved in the short time after the 
decision was given.  
On the day of the press reporting on the sentence, the then Home Secretary, John Reid 
described the sentencing as ‘unduly lenient’; making an overt, direct public criticism of the 
judiciary, more specifically the decision of an individual judge. The Home Office, supporting 
Dr Reid’s comments, stated that while the life sentence is the ‘ultimate sanction a court can 
make’ it was felt that the minimum tariff did not reflect the seriousness of the crime.152 Not 
only did the Home Secretary comment on the length of the sentence, he also requested that the 
Lord Chancellor refer the decision for consideration by the Court of Appeal.153 For a 
government minister to take such a stance against the judiciary and become so involved in the 
functions of the judiciary seems to exemplify the reasons why it is necessary to protect the 
independence and autonomy of judicial institutions. The decision by Reid to talk so publicly 
against the judiciary does not adhere to Lord Lloyd’s understanding of the need to protect the 
                                                        
150 The Guardian, ‘Reid seeks review of paedophile sentence’. The Guardian, London. Monday 12 June 2006 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jun/12/ukcrime.immigrationpolicy > accessed 10 March 2011. 
151 BBC, ‘Child sex snatch jailing insult’ 12 June 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/5069656.stm> 
accessed 09 March 2011. 
152 Ibid., at 18. 
153 Ben Russell, ‘Reid seeks review of paedophile’s sentence as girl’s family hits out’ The Independent, 13 June 
2006 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/reid-seeks-review-of-paedophiles-sentence-as-girls-
family-hit-out-482157.html> accessed 10 April 2011. 
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judiciary from external attacks. Although Reid is external to the judiciary, he is still expected 
to uphold his duty under section 3 in his role as a government minister. Arguably, the lack of 
clarity for how this is done can be remedied in this very instance by demonstrating behaviour 
which is not considered acceptable under section 3. However, the Chief Crown Prosecutor for 
South Wales also stated an intention to refer the case to the Attorney-General and request an 
appeal. In accordance with section 3 of the CRA 2005, this type of behaviour from another 
member of the judiciary is wholly unacceptable when striving to create greater protection of 
judicial independence. As Lord Falconer acknowledged, there are two options for raising 
concerns either to speak to the individual privately, or publicly. The decision by both Reid 
and the Chief Crown Prosecutor to speak publicly against the decision shows a clear disregard 
for their duties under section 3, and for the need to provide further clarity for ways to protect 
judicial independence.  
The other important reason to consider the Sweeney case is the speed at which the responses 
were made to the decision. After the decision on Monday 12 June 2006, Dr Reid, the press 
and some individual judges passed comment on the sentence on Tuesday 13 June; with the 
general consensus that it was too lenient. Thus, the sentencing process and the judges 
themselves came under considerable attack.154 It was not until Thursday 15 June 2006, three 
days after the sentence was passed, that the Lord Chancellor commented publicly on the 
reaction to the decision. On BBC’s Question Time, he stated that ‘we’ should be careful not to 
criticise the judges where it the system which is at fault.155 He condemned the fact that much 
of the criticism had occurred internally, coming from other judges. Vera Baird QC, who at the 
                                                        
154 See the House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 at page 19 ‘The 
Craig Sweeney case: sequence of events table in which all response is documented fully. 
155 See the House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 at page 19 ‘The 
Craig Sweeney case: sequence of events table in which all response is documented fully. The Lord Chancellor’s 
reaction is documented at Thursday 15 June 2006. 
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time was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, commented when appearing on BBC’s Any Questions? that the judge had, ‘got the 
[sentencing] formula wrong’.156 However, the Lord Chancellor was also careful to maintain 
that John Reid did not attack the judge, but the system itself. The Lord Chancellor’s actions at 
this time are an interesting example of divided responsibility between maintaining 
harmonious relationships with government ministers and ensuring protection of judicial 
independence. It is questionable whether his actions did succeed in protecting the judiciary – 
placing blame on the system, while avoiding attacking an individual judge, does arguably still 
attack judicial process, something which does not aid judicial independence and the overall 
integrity of the judicial system. 
The general reaction to the Sweeney decision, and how the Lord Chancellor dealt with the 
response, was that it was an insufficient protection for judicial independence.157 Although the 
Sweeney case is used to demonstrate an attack made by a Government minister on a member 
of the judiciary, it still has some useful implications for the notion of institutional autonomy 
in relation to internal and external threats. The importance of reducing any direct criticism of 
judicial work by government is another reason to embrace the notion of institutional 
autonomy. External interference may come from the executive or legislative branches of 
government, but could include the media and the impact that focus can have on a judicial 
institution. The recognition of the requirement of limits to the unnecessary interference can 
serve to further extend and support the statutory rule in Section 3 of the CRA 2005.  An 
established practice of recognising the degree of institutional autonomy would enable a 
degree of prevention of such interference; offering a basis from which to challenge whatever 
                                                        
156 Ibid., Vera Baird’s reaction is mentioned at Friday 16 June 2006. 
157 Frances Gibb, Legal Editor of The Times and Joshua Rozenburg, Legal Editor of The Daily Telegraph both 
felt that the judicial reaction did not occur quickly enough and that the Lord Chancellor should have provided 
comment and defence of the judicial decision immediately.  
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behaviour occurs. If it is acknowledged that an institution, be it judicial or otherwise, requires 
a reduction in interference from any other source then a strategy for that reduction can be 
made. In the case of a court, if the interference were coming from the media, for example, 
then it could be stated that this was affecting the level of institutional autonomy and, by 
proxy, affecting the independence of the institution. Institutional autonomy would be in place 
to support an argument for greater independence and protection from threats to that 
independence by having the means to assess the level of autonomy and publish it 
unambiguously. The Select Committee’s sixth report suggests that changes need to be made 
by the Prime Minister to the Ministerial Code to ensure that constitutional conventions are 
recognised and adhered to in order to regulate interactions between the branches of 
government.158 The Sweeney case demonstrated the first proper test of the changes of the 
relationship between the executive and the judiciary and suggests that although clarification 
of the separation of powers had begun to take place, it was not yet sufficient to uphold the 
element of the rule of requiring an independent judiciary. The concept of power in the 
doctrine is important, and each separate branch or institution must be fully aware of its 
powers and how they work in line with other institutions. It was clear that further to this 
legislative separation, greater awareness of institutional separation, and how it can be 
achieved, was needed.159 This institutional separation of the most senior judges, the Law 
Lords, came about following the enactment of Part 3 of the CRA 2005 and the creation of the 
new UKSC. 
 
 
                                                        
158 House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution, Sixth Report, Session 2006-07 at page 19. Para. 51 and 52. 
159 Institutional separation of branches within government would include monitoring the relationships between 
actors, i.e. government ministers and judges or the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary. 
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The development of legislative provision for institutional autonomy  
The business of the Supreme Court began on 1 October 2009, realising an institutional 
separation of the Law Lords from the House of Lords. The impact this new separation might 
have on the constitution and judicial independence was debated heavily beforehand. However, 
there was still some degree of trepidation when waiting to see what it would really mean to 
have a Supreme Court: institutionally separate from Government. Part 3 of the CRA 2005 
provides the legislative provision for the Court’s creation but prior to an analysis of those 
provisions, it is important to consider the development of proposals for the Supreme Court 
and whether the intended objectives are aligned with the realised situation and business of the 
Court.  
Following the announcement of major changes to the machinery of government by the Blair 
government in June 2003 in a press release, there was call for a clear outline of the proposals 
so that they may be subjected to thorough scrutiny, both within Parliament and by 
consultation with the judiciary. On 26 January 2004, the Government announced the outcome 
of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justices’ negotiations in relation to the transfer of 
functions from the Lord Chancellor to the judiciary and the Lord Chief Justice. This outcome 
is known as the ‘Concordat’ and is felt by some to have become a constitutional convention 
that guides practice of government.160 The Concordat pre-empted the Constitutional Reform 
Bill’s passage through Parliament and explains that the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord 
Chancellor (the Secretary of State, a Minister responsible for judiciary-related functions) 
should have their responsibilities set out by statute, ‘so as to provide clarity and transparency 
                                                        
160 The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, Third Report, Session 2004-05 at para. 7 states: 
‘we agree: many of the principles set out in the Concordat are reflected in the [Constitutional Reform] Bill. 
Further recognition, even entrenchment, is unnecessary. The Concordat will remain a document of constitutional 
importance.’ 
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in [the] relationship.’161 The Concordat sets out the need for statute to ensure that the new 
rearrangements can uphold judicial independence and that all Government ministers should 
look to ensure this is protected. At the time, the office of Lord Chancellor was transferred to 
the Secretary of State for the newly created Department for Constitutional Affairs. The 
Concordat discussed arrangements for the judiciary as a whole, and did not make detailed 
reference to the Supreme Court. However, there is an important section on the provision of 
resources. It states how, as set out in Part 1 of the Courts Act 2003, the Secretary of State 
should ensure that there are sufficient resources to allow the courts to carry out their business 
as planned. The resources in question relate to financial, material and human resources.162 
Such provision is in line with the notion of institutional autonomy and suggests an intention to 
ensure that judicial institutions are able to function with a sufficient degree of independence; 
therefore upholding the rule of law. In addition to this provision, there is the further proposal 
that the arrangements should allow the judiciary to be involved in strategic planning of 
resources and budgetary bids. 
 
The Lord Chancellor, and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, Lord Falconer, was 
clear during the passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill through Parliament in 2004 that the 
Supreme Court should be ‘administered as a distinct constitutional entity’ and also enjoy 
financial independence.163 The impression given at this time was for a court whose links to 
any minister would merely be as a conduit for information, not as a provider of finance or 
resources. Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform Bill outlined provision for the new Supreme 
Court but was, however, somewhat stark in terms of aiding in the interpretation of sections. 
                                                        
161 House of Lords, Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, First Report, Session 2003-04 at Appendix 6 ‘The 
Lord Chancellor’s Judiciary-Related functions: Proposals (the “concordat”), para. 3. 
162 Ibid., at para. 19. 
163 HL Hansard, 8 March 2004, at column 982. 
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House of Lords debates on the Bill during its passage provide a much more worthwhile set of 
information on the intentions of Government. Lord Falconer, in a House of Lords debate on 8 
March 2004 stated that the Constitutional Reform Bill ‘…seeks to make our constitution more 
transparent and logical by creating at the apex of the judicial systems a Supreme Court which 
is visibly independent of the legislature’: a clear statement of the importance of autonomy and 
independence.164 An interesting, and important, point for discussion is the fact that Lord 
Falconer set out that the Supreme Court would not be a part of Her Majesty’s Court Service 
but instead provide a small court service of its own. Lord Falconer states that while Minister, 
the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs (now Justice Secretary), must ensure that 
there are sufficient resources for the Court to carry out its business the Supreme Court would 
not be a Part of the Court System. It would, instead, ‘…form a separate entity administered 
for the benefit of all constituent parts of the UK.’165 This clearly demonstrates a need for 
institutional separation, both physical in a new building away from Parliament, but also a 
functional separation of the duties and role of the court. The legally separate institution also 
provides the final court of appeal for Scotland and Northern Ireland and it is important to note 
that the Supreme Court ‘…falls outside the remit of the Lord Chief Justice’.166 At this point, 
there are no significant changes or additions to those outlined by the Concordat in early 2004. 
The sections of the CRA which relate to the Supreme Court have varying implications for the 
notion of institutional autonomy. In the enacted statute, the Supreme Court provisions fall 
under Part 3, not Part 2 as in the Bill. Section 23 makes provision for the creation of a 
Supreme Court and the twelve justices to be appointed: outlining also the appointment of a 
                                                        
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid., at column 983. 
166 Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘The Supreme Court’ 2011 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-
judiciary/introduction-to-justice-system/the-supreme-court> 
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President and Deputy President of the Court.167 In relation to the provision of resources 
discussed before the Act’s enactment, it was suggested that the finance for the Court would 
come straight from the Treasury and be paid out of the Consolidated Fund- thus removing, or 
minimising, Government involvement in the process. Following estimates formed by the 
House of Commons, an annual amount of funding would be handed to the Supreme Court and 
the Chief Executive would work with the President to decide how that money is spend; 
seemingly a very positive intention toward granting institutional autonomy, specifically in 
relation to budgetary freedom. The majority of the Constitutional Reform Bill Committee felt 
that the Supreme Court should have, ‘…greater financial and administrative autonomy’ and 
be established, ‘according to the model of a non-ministerial department.’168 Therefore, as 
funding would go straight from the Treasury to the Court, there could be little need for 
ministerial involvement in the funding process. Section 34(5) in relation to judicial Salaries 
and Allowances, states that ‘Salaries payable under this section are to be charged on and paid 
out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.’169 This provision suggests an 
adherence to the initial proposals; however, there is no real mention of the procedure for 
budgeting and the provision of finance for the Court’s administration. Section 52 ‘Fees’ states 
that the Lord Chancellor should prescribe any fees that arise in a matter dealt with by the 
Supreme Court. The explanatory notes of the Act state that, in line with the duty of the Lord 
Chancellor in section 52, subsection (3), the power to prescribe fees must be used with regard 
for the principle that access to the courts should not be denied. This appears to lack clarity in 
terms of what is meant by the term ‘fees’. If it is expenditure, then this should be covered by 
an already-decided budget. The Act does not provide guidance for the budgetary process of 
the Supreme Court. This lack of clarity and provision may, or may not, be deliberate however, 
                                                        
167 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part 3, section 23(1-7). 
168 House of Lords, Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, First Report, Session 2003-04, at para 268. 
169 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part 3. 
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it has recently become apparent that the area is one which calls for guidance to be offered, as 
will be seen below. 
The development of proposals from the initial announcements for constitutional reform in 
2003 to the enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act in 2005; culminating in the creation 
of the Supreme Court in 2009 have shown an interesting progression of thought in terms of 
allowing a degree of institutional autonomy for the judiciary and the highest court of the UK. 
The proposals for independence and the realised degree may be somewhat different and a 
specific analysis of each requirement of institutional autonomy is needed to assess the 
institutional autonomy of the Supreme Court. 
 
The UKSC: an analysis of its institutional autonomy 
As outlined by Chapter 2, there are three main requirements for institutional autonomy: 
budgetary freedom, administrative freedom and the lack of unnecessary interference. Each of 
these requirements can guide the analysis of how much autonomy and independence exists for 
the Supreme Court and whether or not this is sufficient to satisfy section 3 of the CRA 2005 
and ultimately, the rule of law. 
Budgetary freedom 
There are three main aspects to the understanding of budgetary freedom: the provision of 
finance; the responsibility for budgeting; and the allocation of resources. It is important to 
consider each of these elements separately when analysing the degree of institutional 
autonomy that exists for a given institution. In relation to the Supreme Court, it is possible to 
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look at the intended legislative creation of budgetary freedom but also to look into more 
detailed reports on budgets and progress from its foundation to assess the realised level of 
freedom. Firstly, the responsibility for budgeting and the allocation of resources will be 
considered, followed by a discussion surrounding the provision. Following the intentions of 
the Labour Government for constitutional reform and to ensure budgetary freedom, the 
Supreme Court Chief Executive Jenny Rowe explained that the Court should have its own 
Estimate and the annual granting of funds should not come via the Ministry of Justice.170 
Rowe outlined how the Court would receive a three-year allocation of funds as a result of the 
Government Spending Review. The current provision of finance for the Supreme Court is an 
area of some unrest for members of the judiciary and proponents of an institutionally 
autonomous Supreme Court. 
The responsibility for budgeting in the Supreme Court falls to the President and the Chief 
Executive.171 The Chief Executive negotiates a bid with the President that is currently put 
forward for approval by the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice. While this may 
sound relatively satisfactory in terms of the Supreme Court having autonomy to decide what 
finance is required and place a bid, the process of having said finance provided is altogether 
much more complex and ultimately, does not promote autonomy. Again, this situation does 
not reflect that proposed by Lord Falconer, that the Supreme Court could decide, based on a 
number of factors, on a budget and that bid would be scrutinised by the Treasury. As will be 
seen, it is reluctance on the part of the Treasury that, in part, is responsible for the much lower 
degree of autonomy in relation to budgeting. Once the finance has been given to the Court, 
the responsibility falls to the President and Chief Executive as to how and where the money is 
                                                        
170 Jenny Rowe, ‘Speech on the status of the Supreme Court’, 17 November 2008 at the UKSC conference, Law 
Society, London. 
171 Section 51, Constiutitonal Reform Act 2005.  A detailed analysis of the role and responsibilities of the Chief 
Executive will occur in the following section on administrative freedom. 
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spent. The allocation of resources, provided through funding, is left to the decision of the 
Supreme Court and this would appear to be a positive step to allowing a greater level of 
autonomous decision-making. However, under Section 49(2) of the CRA 2005, all such 
decisions relating to officers and staff must still be agreed with the Lord Chancellor.  
The provision of finance to the Supreme Court is an area that has recently received a great 
deal of criticism from senior members of the judiciary. In a speech at the UCL’s Constitution 
Unit, Lord Phillips, the former President of the Supreme Court, outlined a number of concerns 
relating to the budgetary freedom of the Supreme Court. One of the main aims surrounding 
the creation of a new supreme court was to achieve institutional independence of the judiciary 
but also to demonstrate a new degree of financial independence.172 It can be seen that a higher 
degree of financial independence can lead to securing autonomy, through a reduction of 
control from internal or external sources in terms of deciding how much funding should be 
allocated to the institution in question. Lord Falconer set out proposals for the Supreme Court 
to place a bid for finance directly to the Treasury and after scrutiny, the budget would be sent 
directly to the Supreme Court from the Consolidated Fund; a proposal that, on the face of it, 
seems relatively straightforward and allows for a good degree of autonomy. Sadly, the 
intended degree of financial independence and the actual degree are somewhat different. This 
was an area for much debate during the Bill’s passage through Parliament as some felt that the 
Court should not have such a degree of budgetary freedom, while others supported the 
notion.173 The initial point of interest when discussing the provision of finance requirement is 
the Middlesex Guildhall itself and the process of obtaining the building in which the Supreme 
Court is now housed. The acquisition of the building from construction group, Kier, was not 
                                                        
172 House of Lords, Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, First Report, Session 2003-04 at Appendix 6 ‘The 
Lord Chancellor’s Judiciary-Related functions: Proposals (the “concordat”), para. 19. 
173 See earlier comment from Consitutional Reform Bill Committee: House of Lords, Constitutional Reform Bill 
Committee, First Report, Session 2003-04, at para 268. 
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made by the Government or by Her Majesty’s Courts Service; the thirty-year leasehold was 
purchased by Prupim, a part of Prudential’s asset management branch, for somewhere in the 
region of £1.8 million per annum.174 While it is ambitious to assume that there is funding, 
especially in a time of little or no economic growth, for a new institution to purchase such a 
building outright, the link to an external body who retains ultimate control over the institution 
in terms of the building itself must reduce, to some degree, the level of budgetary freedom. It 
is a potential restriction or limiting factor in the process of deciding a budget bid and a 
consideration that, to a variable degree, could affect the institutional autonomy of the 
Supreme Court. The variable degree occurs depending on how much or little interference the 
body holding ownership which to make in the business of the institution, in this case Prupim 
and the Supreme Court. As discussed in the Commons on 8 February 2007, ‘the capital 
construction costs involved in the refurbishment of Middlesex Guildhall will be met by 
regular charges (rent) over a 30-year period as part of the lease and leaseback arrangement 
[they] are using’.175 
Further to the acquisition and ownership of the building, and the subsequent associated costs 
such as rental expenditure, there is also the matter of the budgeting process. There has been a 
great degree of friction from the Treasury in deciding how finance will be provided for the 
Supreme Court; with the Treasury rejecting outright the proposal of ‘a completely free-
standing body’ that deals with them directly.176 The Treasury’s suggestion that the Supreme 
Court should recover full running costs from the cost of court fees was rejected, with senior 
Justices feeling it would result in a denial of access to justice from costs being unattainable 
                                                        
174 Graham Ruddick, “Prupim buys new UK Supreme Court” The Telegraph, London. October 2 2009 
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175 Hansard HC, Vol 456, Col. 1170W (8 Feb 2007). 
176 Lord Phillips, Lecture on Judicial Independence, University College London, 8 February 2011, at page 13. 
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for many of those wishing to appeal. The current system of funding is complex and does not 
encourage a great deal of autonomy in this area. Lord Falconer’s proposal for the budget to be 
provided from the Consolidated Fund was derived from a consideration of the provision of 
finance for the Appellate Committee within the House of Lords prior to the Supreme Court’s 
creation. The Law Lords, in their position in the Upper House, had a ‘relatively direct tap into 
government coffers’ using the process of a committee to decide the budget and Parliament to 
provide finance from the Consolidated Fund; a stark contrast to the new system in practice at 
present.177 The Supreme Court currently receives contribution-based finance: an amount of 
funding is taken from civil court fees across England and Wales, but also Scotland and 
Northern Ireland (as the Supreme Court has jurisdiction there); “wider market initiatives” in 
the form of finance from merchandise and rental of facilities to others; and then the shortfall 
is provided by the Treasury. Regardless of the need for contribution, the civil courts have so 
far not met the required amount, and the Lord Chancellor has had to make up the remaining 
finance required. Lord Phillips feels that this is unsatisfactory in ensuring any degree of 
financial independence- such a heavy reliance on contributions from other courts, and in the 
current case, Government by way of the Lord Chancellor, will inevitably subject the Court to 
the negotiations with Government and other bodies for finance that the CRA 2005 had hoped 
to avoid.178 It would seem that in the process of ensuring judicial independence, through a 
clearer physical operation of the separation of powers by removing the Law Lords from the 
House of Lords, has, in fact, reduced their financial independence and therefore the 
institutional autonomy. The autonomy that existed previously may not have been transparent- 
the position of the Appellate Committee in Parliament is difficult to justify if the separation of 
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powers is to be employed- but in the case of budgetary freedom, the degree was greater before 
the removal of the Appellate Committee to the Supreme Court. This outcome is not the 
product of deliberate design, but rather a more informal product from the evolution of the 
institution. There is a sense of irony in the reality of the current degree of budgetary freedom 
since it seems to contravene the intention of creating greater independence.  
The most recent budget for 2010/11 has been subject to constraints placed upon it by the Lord 
Chancellor. Due to spending cuts throughout the public sector, it is reasonable to assume that 
all institutions should endeavour to make savings or cuts where it is viable to do so. However, 
a letter from the Lord Chancellor to the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, 
noted the possibility of the amalgamating the Supreme Court with the rest of the Courts 
Service in order to reduce costs. It may be that if the Supreme Court was merged with the 
Courts Service, it would mean that it would have less need to draw funding from other courts’ 
fees. Again, Lord Phillips reacted stating that this was, ‘totally unacceptable’ both for 
institutional autonomy and for the principle of judicial independence.179 If the Supreme Court 
were to be viewed as a part of the existing Courts Service, it would no longer be viewed as a 
separate constitutional entity and this would mean that the final court of appeal in the UK was 
not as clearly separate from other judicial and political institutions as intended by the CRA 
2005. After Phillips’ speech on 8 February, there was a swift reaction from Government and 
Ken Clarke MP, Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor, insisted that lack of power to set, and 
receive, its own budget made the court was no different from any other body that he was 
responsible for. This may be true, but again it does not seem conducive to securing greater 
independence; as already outlined, greater independence is achieved by taking a multi-faceted 
approach of which budgetary freedom is fundamental. This seems an odd justification when 
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the initial proposals had promised the Supreme Court a good degree of budgetary freedom 
before its creation, however this does demonstrate the influence of changing government and 
changing government priorities. There are other financial links to Government which are 
currently affecting the degree of institutional autonomy and budgetary freedom: the Supreme 
Court’s finance system. Presently, the Ministry of Justice’s finance contractor provides the 
Supreme Court’s finance system but the Supreme Court’s Director of Finance, Olufemi 
Oguntunde, has recently put forward a proposal relating to the current finance systems used in 
the Court.180 Mr Oguntunde is suggesting that the UKSC should purchase, and administer, its 
own finance system both in relation to budgeting and also in relation to payment and receipt 
of fees. In terms of institutional autonomy, this would be a beneficial removal of another link 
to a Government department and one that could add to the degree of institutional autonomy 
secured. Both of these instances demonstrate close links and ties to the Ministry of Justice, 
something that the previous Government was adamant should not occur.  
If the Supreme Court were to be considered in the same process as a government department 
in the provision of courts services with Her Majesty’s Court Service, as implied by the Justice 
Secretary, it would reduce any degree of autonomy to a minimum since it would be subjected 
to the same constraints as all other courts. The reasoning behind an autonomous top Court 
was to ensure it was seen to independent from Government and able to operate with the 
necessary freedoms to secure that independence. Although the proposals and Lord Phillips’ 
suggestions for the budgetary freedom of the Supreme Court would achieve a very high 
degree, thus satisfying that element of institutional autonomy, there must be a level of 
practicability in the processes adopted. While it may be useful for the process to echo the 
previous system in the House of Lords and work directly between the Court and the Treasury, 
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there are reasons why this has not happened. The notion of greater institutional autonomy can 
provide the basis for a critical evaluation of the current degree and may offer remedies should 
it be wholly unsatisfactory. However, in the event that the process is working and providing 
adequate finance, albeit subject to wide-ranging cuts to funding, it must be felt to some degree 
that the current budgetary freedom must be sufficient. The above outlines an undeniable 
contrast between the proposed provision of finance by Lord Falconer, before the CRA 2005 
was drafted, and the current system of subsidised funding, by way of contribution, suggests 
that the government may not as committed to creating a greater degree budgetary freedom as 
was first thought. This could be due to a change in Government, but it may also be a response 
to the change in financial climate and until the UK regains its economic stability, it is perhaps 
unreasonable to assume that independent institutions can afford to be wholly responsible for 
their own finance.  Recognition of the need for budgetary freedom as part of the notion of 
institutional autonomy could drive the strategic development in this area and aid a more fluid 
budgetary process once the finance is available and such stringent rehabilitation of the 
economy is replaced by a system of effective maintenance. 
 
Administrative freedom 
The second facet of the notion of institutional autonomy is that of administrative freedom. 
While it can be considered individually, there is often a natural overlap with the budgetary 
freedom requirement. This is due to the two elements of ‘normal’ functioning institutions- 
finance and administration- being inextricably linked. In the case of the Supreme Court, the 
head of the institution is the Chief Executive; a role put in place by section 48(1) of the CRA 
2005. The Executive team, which operates alongside the twelve Justices, ensures effective 
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day-to-day running of the Court but is also involved in budgeting and in developing the 
institution’s independence. The twelve justices continue to hear cases and make decisions 
based on precedent; the President of the Court, liaises closely with the Executive team to 
ensure that resources are provided and staffing is adequate.  
The administrative freedom of the Court does not only relate to the overall administration, but 
also to the accountability of the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive, by way of section 
48(3)(a-b) of the CRA 2005, may be asked to carry out functions in relation to appointments 
and staffing of the Court and also non-judicial functions. Section 48(4) of the Act provides 
that, ‘[t]he chief executive must carry out his functions…in accordance with any directions 
given by the President of the Court’ and this could be an important provision for the notion of 
institutional autonomy in that it requires the President of the Supreme Court to retain ultimate 
direction as to the administration of his Court.181 There is a conflict, however, in the 
understanding of how the Court would be administered and the reality of the accountability of 
both the President of the Court and the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive, Jenny Rowe, is 
a civil servant appointed as a lay member of the Court’s Executive team. The then Justice 
Secretary, Ken Clarke, pointed out that this accountability to government would be the same 
for a chief executive of a government quango.182 Lord Phillips’ in his reaction to the Court’s 
current procedure stated that the staff of the Court needed to be accountable to the Chief 
Executive who, in turn, needed to be accountable to the President of the Court. This insular 
system of accountability he felt would ensure the autonomy and independence of the Court 
through its administration. However, the Chief Executive’s connections to government as a 
civil servant would suggest that the independence of the Court could be put in jeopardy. This 
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is unlikely as the Chief Executive receives her functions from the President, not the 
government and the process of providing annual reports merely aids in the argument for 
creating a transparent justice system. It is useful to be aware of the accountability 
arrangements, but during the first year and a half of the Court’s business there has been little 
concern over the decisions made by the Chief Executive and certainly no accusations of 
loyalty to government. It is important to remember that the overarching aim of creating the 
new UKSC was to ‘clarify the relationship between the Judiciary, Government and 
Parliament’ not to remove all connection between the three branches.183 There is an argument 
against Phillips’ reaction that the Chief Executive should ultimately be responsible to the 
Court as a whole rather than specifically to the President. If there were to be a clash of 
opinion or a difference in motivation or outlook between the President and the Chief 
Executive, then this is where informal rules may need to develop. It is not possible to legislate 
for every eventuality or predict how different institutional actors will interact with each other. 
If the relationship between the President and the Chief Executive were to be problematic, this 
is where convention may develop in order to govern their interactions. This would reflect the 
expected behaviour of those actors and should ultimately be for the benefit of the Court as a 
whole. There is the possibility that a future President may use the statutory accountability of 
the Chief Executive to enforce procedures which may not be in the wider interests of the 
Court. 
The other aspect of the administrative freedom requirement is the freedom that the institution 
has in terms of deciding how and where the resources are allocated. The amount and type of 
resources that the Court has available is linked, inevitably, to the budgetary process and the 
amount of finance received. Feedback from the former President of the Supreme Court, Lord 
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Phillips, stated that the Chief Executive, Jenny Rowe, made the transition from the House of 
Lords to the Middlesex Guildhall as seamless as possible.184 Such comments would suggest 
the Chief Executive had a good level of freedom and control in determining how early 
resources were used to set-up the Court and to begin business but also adhered, as would be 
expected, to the statutory duty under section 51.185  
Further to this freedom for the Chief Executive to fulfil her functions to allocate resources in 
the creation of the Court and in relation to budget, is the freedom to decide on more specific 
aspects of administration. In an interview with the editors of the UKSC Blog, Baroness Hale 
commented on, ‘…one or two branding things’ which directly link to the notion of 
administrative freedom and have a negative impact on the level of administrative freedom 
enjoyed by the UKSC.186 Firstly, in relation to communications systems, Baroness Hale notes 
how the Supreme Court joined the government’s secure intranet which in itself raises some 
concerns for autonomy. However, in addition to using this government intranet, there is a 
notice at the bottom of messages which states that emails will be recorded and monitored by 
the Ministry of Justice. As Baroness Hale states, it is not, ‘…acceptable for emails sent from 
or within any court to suggest that its email traffic is monitored by government.’187 It is fairly 
clear to see how this affects institutional autonomy by demonstrating clear and current links to 
government, but also in terms of judicial independence for securing transparency. The other 
branding issue which Baroness Hale discusses in the interview relates to provision of catering 
services. Baroness Hale relates what she refers to as a ‘silly little story’ that demonstrates a 
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more significant issue of autonomy for the Court.188 On requesting a bottle of water from the 
Supreme Court’s café she was told, ‘…it was ministry policy that they couldn't sell bottled 
water because tap water was good enough.’189 To achieve sufficient administrative freedom, 
the Supreme Court should have its own directive on catering arrangements and alike and not 
follow Ministry of Justice or government policy. While this may seem a very small and 
specific instance of the intrusion of government policy on the non-core functions of the 
Supreme Court, it has a significant impact on the level of institutional autonomy.  
The above discussion demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s administration is not flawless 
and is subject to some influential links to government. The accountability of the Chief 
Executive and the powers that she has to determine how resources are allocated would seem 
sufficient to achieve a good degree of administrative freedom. However, on closer inspection, 
there are some specific policy issues which mean that the Court does not have as much 
administrative freedom, thus negatively impacting the notion of institutional autonomy. A 
further reduction in administrative freedom could occur if the Court’s administration is 
subjected to unwanted interference from government in relation to the allocation of resources 
or if there is a request for greater accountability by the Chief Executive to government itself. 
  
Unnecessary interference 
The notion of institutional autonomy does not suggest that the Court should not be subject to 
any interference but that any interference is useful or necessary.  The earlier example of the 
Sweeney case is exactly the type of interference affecting judicial institutions that would be 
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deemed unnecessary by the notion of institutional autonomy.  
 
The other element to this is the need to gain an understanding of any hierarchy of authority 
that exists surrounding the judicial institution in question.  In relation to this, it is necessary to 
look at the type of interference coming from institutions higher than the Supreme Court. The 
hierarchy in question relates to the three main branches of government; as noted by Roger 
Masterman, ‘[u]nder a sovereign legislature, any division of power between the arms of 
government is therefore hierarchical, rather than as between co-equal branches.’190 Some may 
consider this a naïve view of the current system of government: Alison Young stated the need 
for change when considering Parliamentary sovereignty as being legislative sovereignty 
only.191 Until there is formalisation of this change in approach, and while the current view is 
of a sovereign Parliament and a clear separation of powers, it is right to consider the Supreme 
Court to be part of hierarchy of authority with the Executive and Parliament. If Parliament 
passes legislation conferring new powers on the Supreme Court, or limiting current powers, 
then it will, in most cases, be accepted and adhered to.192 Parliament is above the Supreme 
Court, as a part of the judiciary, in terms of authority, whereas the Executive could be 
considered ‘co-equal’ with the judiciary, to use Masterman’s term; this would support the 
need to ensure institutional autonomy from Government by way of an independent Supreme 
Court.193 When assessing the institutional autonomy of the Supreme Court, it is useful to note 
that interference, by way of orders or legislation, from Parliament will not adversely affect the 
Court’s autonomy. If there is interference from the Executive, or a governmental department 
such as the Ministry of Justice, then it could be questioned.  
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The last element of unnecessary interference is the idea that there can be both internal and 
external interference. Firstly, external threats to the institutional autonomy of the Supreme 
Court relate mainly to the provision of finance. The current economic climate and 
Government drive for growth has meant that there have been significant cuts to public sector 
funding: a government figure states savings of between 25% and 40% in the spending review 
year of 2010/11.194 This is a significant reduction in funding provision and suggests that the, 
already unsatisfactory, system of funding for the Supreme Court will be subjected to further 
constraints. It is unlikely that the Courts Service will be able to provide the estimated 
contribution and that the Supreme Court will be forced to request contribution from the 
Ministry of Justice. This, in turn, will be a lesser contribution if the Government cuts occur as 
expected. Such a reduction in funding has resulted in unnecessary external interference for the 
Supreme Court as it becomes ever more reliant on contribution.  
 
The second type of interference, from internal sources, must also be assessed. Some external 
threats to institutional autonomy are expected as no business or institution is insular or should 
desire to be so. However, there is also the possibility of interference coming from internal 
sources. In this case, sources within the judiciary. The main cause of interference for the 
Supreme Court is the office of Lord Chancellor within the judiciary. As has been shown, 
throughout the CRA 2005 there are constant references to the Lord Chancellor and 
demonstrations of a reliance on the decisions of the Lord Chancellor when providing 
resources, funding, courthouse, staff and appointments. This level of involvement is 
significantly affecting the degree of institutional autonomy. At present, the need for approval 
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and involvement of the Lord Chancellor is not allowing for true independence of decision-
making powers for the President and Chief Executive of the Supreme Court. While it is 
important to retain some process of checking the systems in place in areas such as 
appointments and resource funding, the Lord Chancellor should have minimal involvement 
and control over the Supreme Court’s functions. Another possible source of internal 
interference for the Supreme Court could come from an unharmonious relationship between 
the President of the Court and the Chief Executive. This could be due to professional 
differences of opinion or may arise due to the President’s legal objectives and the Chief 
Executive’s administrative objectives and civil service connections.  
 
An interesting point to consider is the rather enigmatic role of the Lord Chief Justice. The 
notion of institutional autonomy sets out two types of interference: those external to the 
judiciary and those which occur internally. Any potential interference from the Lord Chief 
Justice would, on the face of it, be classed as internal as he is a member of the judiciary. 
However, the Lord Chief Justice is not a member of the UKSC so in relation to any 
interference with the function of the Supreme Court, the Lord Chief Justice could be seen to 
be an external form of interference. A further consideration in relation to this role is when the 
Lord Chief Justice sits as an ad hoc judge in the UKSC; which would place him in an internal 
role. As stated in the previous chapter, as Head of the Judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice should 
share the common judicial objective of ensuring greater judicial independence and in theory 
would not act in a way which may jeopardise this.  
 
An example of unnecessary interference affecting the Supreme Court came in response to 
Lord Phillips’ speech in February 2011. The Law Gazette has commented that the Home 
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Office was unimpressed by the apparent attack on the Government from the judiciary and that 
there would be a greater reaction than Ken Clarke’s appearance on Radio 4 the following 
morning.195 In the House of Commons on the 16 February 2011, Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Theresa May MP condemned the decision of the UKSC in April 2010 in 
relation to the sex offenders’ register.196 She stated that, ‘the Government are disappointed 
and appalled by that ruling’, arguing that ‘it places the rights of sex offenders above the right 
of the public’.197 Such an attack on a previous decision of the Court raises questions, the 
timing of such criticism occurring shortly after the President of the Court complains about 
unsatisfactory government involvement in the judicial business of the Supreme Court. The 
judgment in R (F) (by his litigation friend F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
stated that sections of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 were incompatible with Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.198 Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 relates to 
Notification Requirements. Section 82 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 requires that 
individuals who are sentenced to 30 months or longer in prison after an offence be subject to a 
notification requirement indefinitely to allow the justice system to be aware of their location, 
regardless of whether or not it is outside the jurisdiction. The notification requirements mean 
that the individual is placed on the commonly termed the ‘sex offenders’ register’ for life. 
This, the Supreme Court Justices felt, could be a breach of Article 8 Convention right to 
privacy and a decision must be made which discusses proportionality of the offence and the 
sentence.  
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The Human Rights Act 1998, section 4(4)(b) requires that should a court find legislation to be 
contrary to Convention rights that they may make a declaration of incompatibility. However, 
subsection (6)(a) of the same section states that a declaration of incompatibility, ‘does not 
affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision’.199 Former Home 
Secretary Jack Straw MP present in the House of Commons questioned the fact that the 
government need not take any notice of the declaration of incompatibility to which May 
replied that Parliament would have the final decision on the issue.200 May goes on to finish 
the debate by saying that the Conservative government will, ‘ensure that [they] take action to 
assert the rights of Parliament’; stating a frustration within government that decisions of 
Parliament are ‘increasingly being overturned by the Courts’.201 Although the above example 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling relating to Article 8, and another judgment given by Strasbourg 
on votes for prisoners, could be used to show how the courts overturn Parliament decisions, as 
Joshua Rozenburg comments, ‘The trouble with the law is that it’s never quite what the 
government wants it to be.’202  
 
As in the Sweeney case and the sixth report of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Constitution, while the judges may still be subject to criticism by government, section 3 of the 
CRA 2005 requires all those involved in the administration of justice to uphold the 
independence of the judiciary. Therefore, in an instance such as this, it seems improper that a 
government minister should so publicly attack a decision of the Supreme Court. While May 
does goes on to concede that the Court was not suggesting that offenders automatically come 
off the register but that their cases should be subject to review, by publicly discussing the 
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matter she laid it open to ministerial and press comment thus subjecting it to an extra degree 
of unnecessary interference.203 The unnecessary interference requirement of the notion of 
institutional autonomy may guide those subject to section 3 of the CRA 2005 by outlining the 
type of interference which is necessary and that which would be deemed unnecessary and 
therefore detrimental to judicial independence.  
 
 
Existing degree of institutional autonomy 
To conclude it is clear that the proposals set out by the Concordat and Lord Falconer in 2004 
have to some degree not been realised. However, the creation of the UKSC and the 
completion of over a year’s business without any considerable problems for the 
administration of the Court is still very positive. The overriding objective to uphold judicial 
independence has come under scrutiny since the enactment of the CRA 2005: both in 2006 
with the Craig Sweeney case and in February of last year as a result of Lord Phillips’ speech 
at the University College London’s Constitution Unit and the subsequent response.   
To respond to the criticism by Lord Phillips’ of the current financial independence of the 
Supreme Court, it would appear on closer analysis that although there may be a more direct 
way to receive finance with minimised government involvement, the current process has 
provided the Court with adequate resources and allowed it to carry out its functions. 
Arguably, the fact of funding by contribution is not ideal and does result in some constraint 
on the budgetary process. However, the degree of budgetary freedom set out by Lord 
Falconer, and reiterated by Lord Phillips, does not take into account the current economic 
climate and while a simple transaction with the Treasury and the Supreme Court would no 
                                                        
203 HC Hansard, 16 February 2011: column 959. 
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doubt improve the institutional autonomy of the Court, it is perhaps not practical at this 
present time. What must not be forgotten is that through the process of setting up the Supreme 
Court, there is a greater transparency of separation between Parliament, the Government and 
the Judiciary and that the area of finance is one which is currently much bigger than within 
the remit of the Supreme Court, the judiciary or even the Government. Further to the degree 
of budgetary freedom required to protect judicial independence further by recognising the 
notion of institutional autonomy is the degree of administrative independence that exists. The 
freedom in relation to the allocation of resources by the Chief Executive appears adequate and 
although linked to the level of finance provided, the process of using the resources given to 
support the Court’s business is happily in line with the CRA 2005.204 The accountability of 
the Chief Executive to the President of the Supreme Court does raise the possibility of a 
conflict between his judicial objectives and the Chief Executive’s links to government as a 
civil servant. The current situation does not significantly reduce the administrative freedom as 
all government departments and institutions, as stated by the Justice Secretary, are subject to 
restrictions on administration due to a lack of financial stability. What is important is to 
ensure that the Court retains its autonomy in terms of decision-making and allocating its 
resources.  
Analysis of the unnecessary interference would suggest that the Court is still subject to 
external threats to its independence, as per the Sweeney case. The decision by the Home 
Secretary to openly criticise the Supreme Court decision of last April does not meet the 
requirements of a sufficient lack of interference. Arguably, the Human Rights Act 1998 
created the possibility of such interference due to the section 4 provisions for making 
declarations of incompatibility. However, the section 3 duty to uphold judicial independence 
                                                        
204 Part 3, section 51 requires the Chief Executive to ensure that the resources are used to provide an effective 
and efficient system for the Court. 
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in the CRA 2005 should govern the behaviour of those in government when it comes to 
commenting on the business of the judiciary. Similarly, the judiciary should refrain from 
commenting in such a way against actions of the government. But as Lord Bingham said, a 
degree of tension is necessary in a constitution that adheres to the separation of powers 
doctrine and a system of checks and balances yet should always be entirely proper. 
While an exact remedy is not within the remit of this thesis, if institutional autonomy were to 
be recognised, Lord Falconer’s proposals of 2004 would be a helpful starting point.The 
interference from external sources is to some degree unavoidable, and the under-spend of the 
Court over the first session means that the proposed cuts will affect the budget bid but may 
not affect the administration of the Court’s functions.205 Direct liaison with HM Treasury on 
budget issues and the provision of finance coming directly from the Consolidated Fund might 
result in increased profit for the Courts Service that is currently contributing to the running 
cost of the Supreme Court but would require significant negotiation and changes to be made 
by all three branches of government. The administration is currently working effectively, 
although the accountability of the Chief Executive to the President is an area of debate. For 
the notion of institutional autonomy, the accountability to the President could both be of 
benefit and increase administrative freedom by reducing government involvement. However, 
the President is subject to government constraints and that would filter down to the functions 
conferred upon the Chief Executive. The degree of unnecessary interference is particularly 
useful to the protection of judicial independence as it can offer a benchmark in terms of what 
is deemed necessary or unnecessary and by highlighting that the interference is not always 
external- there are internal threats as well. 
                                                        
205 Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Business Plan 2010-11. Para. 36, page 18. Available at: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/bp_1011.pdf  Accessed 06/01/2011. 
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To summarise, this analysis of institutional autonomy demonstrates areas that still require 
development to ensure autonomy is possible and that all unnecessary and avoidable links to 
Government are removed. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE FUTURE FOR INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
This final chapter summarises the main points raised by this thesis and provides some 
concluding thoughts. Is an extra notion of institutional autonomy required, in addition to the 
‘protections’ of judicial independence that already exist? Lord Phillips and the University 
College London’s Constitution Unit’s new research project would suggest that judicial 
independence is an undeniably current topic for consideration; being fundamental to securing 
the rule of law in the UK. Institutional autonomy, as set out by this thesis, could provide an 
extra guarantee of the independence of judicial institutions. Institutional autonomy requires a 
detailed investigation of the judicial institution’s design and intended purpose, as well as an 
assessment of the freedom allowed for financing and the day-to-day administration of the 
institution. This, and the type of information required in order to achieve a full assessment of 
the degree of institutional autonomy, could be met with some resistance. Since the 
introduction of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, such a process is made much easier 
with access to required information on a more open basis although information retrieval is not 
without obstacle. What is also important to consider, is that the notion of institutional 
autonomy by degree is a fluid concept and will change depending on the overall intended 
degree of autonomy for that institution. Pre-commencement debates and subsequent drafting 
of provisions surrounding the CRA 2005 clearly demonstrate an intention to create a truly 
independent top court. Yet, as Lord Phillips observed, there are still areas of concern 
surrounding the financial and administrative independence of the court that must be 
addressed. Application of the notion of institutional autonomy can show how these areas are 
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failing currently to ensure adequate judicial independence and remedies can be offered as to 
how these areas can be improved and autonomy secured. 
 
The UKSC’s institutional autonomy: an evaluation 
The current status of funding for the Supreme Court is unsatisfactory and the complex process 
holds too many links to other institutions and to Government departments such as the 
Ministry of Justice. From this, it cannot be said that a sufficient degree of institutional 
autonomy exists. The Supreme Court is reliant on contributions; the Lord Chancellor must 
compensate for any shortfall in the contributions made to the running of the Court by the 
various court services. As discussed previously, the ultimate goal for an institution is to be 
financially self-sufficient; making enough profit to cover all costs and to be able to provide 
adequate funding for resources. Reports from Management Board meetings of the Supreme 
Court suggest an under-spend for the first year of business and a predicted under-spend for 
this financial year.206 According to previous reports (and awaiting the report on this current 
year), it would seem that the Supreme Court has adequate financial systems in place therefore 
making it seem feasible to allow greater autonomy to the Court in requesting finance. It seems 
that the most opposition for greater financial independence came from the Treasury, citing 
reluctance for an independent body, regardless of pre-existing bodies such as the National 
Audit Office operating the same process successfully. It would be interesting to establish if 
this is a reluctance to acknowledge changes to constitutional arrangements, or whether it was 
a fear of adequate management strategy that caused the Treasury’s rejection of the proposals. 
Either way, it can now be put forward to the Treasury that the Supreme Court clearly has 
                                                        
206 The Supreme Court, Meetings, 2011 < http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/meetings.html > accessed 19 
April 2011. A comprehensive list of all monthly meetings of the Supreme Court Management Board. 
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established and proven successful financial planning in place and can place a realistic and 
non-extravagant funding bid. These arguments, although supported by evidence, may be met 
with resistance until the country’s economy has become more stable and there is less scrutiny 
of all financial decisions. The issues surrounding internal interference from the Lord 
Chancellor’s office are more complex in terms of offering potential remedies. The obligations 
placed on the office by the Constitutional Reform Act, to defend and uphold judicial 
independence, result in a level of interference which is currently unhelpful if striving for 
adequate institutional autonomy; mainly due to continued links with government. The fact 
that the Court is reliant on his approval for appointments, funding and also finding a suitable 
venue may trigger questions as to how such links with a Government minster can allow for 
the Court to be truly independent. The previous relationship between President and Chief 
Executive proved harmonious. However, since the retirement of Lord Phillips, it will be 
interesting to see how new relationships develop between the Chief Executive and the new 
President. Will it be equally harmonious?  
 
Chapter 1 outlined arguments made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Sir Francis Purchas for 
there to be a greater degree of autonomy. They both felt that said autonomy would only be 
achievable if the funding and administration of courts was not, ‘subject to the influences of 
the political marketplace.’207 In line with these requirements is the notion of institutional 
autonomy. Having considered the current position of the Supreme Court, it could not be said 
that the Court operates free from those influences. The financial and administrative links to 
the Ministry of Justice and the government as a whole are limiting the Court achieving the 
necessary autonomy. Achieving a higher level of institutional autonomy in the Supreme Court 
                                                        
207 Sir Francis Purchas, ‘What is happening to judicial independence?’ (1994) NLJ 1306 and Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, ‘The independence of judges in the 1980s’, 11th F.A. Mann Lecture. Referenced in Thomas H. 
Bingham, ‘Judicial Independence’ (1997) Arbitration 86, 93. 
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is currently hindered by those issues. The proposals for funding as set out by the Concordat 
would provide for a better level of autonomy and should be considered as the Court moves 
forward and evolves. In relation to the administration issues, notice should be taken of the 
concerns over branding raised by Baroness Hale. The Court should review all policy which 
governs its administration and look at ways to reduce or eliminate government involvement 
where reasonable and practicable. The reasons why these changes are necessary are far-
reaching and benefit not only the Supreme Court but the fundamental constitutional principles 
which support its creation.  
 
An increased level of institutional autonomy in the Supreme Court would be beneficial, 
primarily, in ensuring adherence to the rule of law. In order to develop the existing degree of 
institutional autonomy, there would need to be a greater awareness of its existence and the 
benefits it offers in terms of supporting the principle of judicial independence. In a time of 
such political and social flux, it is important that the judiciary is seen to act both within its 
powers and in the interests of the public. It is particularly pertinent that there are no 
suggestions of political decision making to maintain confidence in the justice system. The 
coalition government will inevitably come into conflict on issues relating to policy and law; 
when such conflict arises it is important that the judiciary is seen as independent and therefore 
capable to monitor and advise. The nation-wide riots in August demonstrate another example 
of the role of the judiciary coming to the forefront of political and public consideration 
reinforcing why the judiciary must be seen to be as independent as possible. 
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The evolving role of the UKSC 
The arguments for requiring greater institutional autonomy of the Supreme Court are 
strengthening due to its evolving role. Commentators have raised the issue of the Court 
developing into a type of constitutional court more associated with countries such as the 
United States. If this were to be case, intentionally or otherwise, it is even more important that 
there is clear collective independence of the court. This may be demonstrable through 
achieving a high level of institutional autonomy which is perhaps more easily proven than 
judicial independence itself. Professor Kate Malleson has recently spoken of a ‘strengthening 
judicial role’ as a result of the Supreme Court’s creation. 208 Malleson attributes this 
strengthening role to the responsibilities placed upon the Court by the Human Rights Act and 
the explicit removal of the Appellate Committee from the House of Lords to enable more 
effective consideration of Executive functions. There are the legal implications under Article 
6(1) of the ECHR if the Court is not seen to be acting fairly and impartially in this event, but 
again the public perception becomes relevant again. As has already been discussed, the extent 
to which the public were or are interested in the Supreme Court is not clear but it is 
guaranteed that should an issue arise where the Court made a declaration of incompatibility 
and Parliament did not agree, the media response would be sure to provoke an interest. But 
aside from discussing potential situations as this, the reality is that there is a significant deficit 
in public interest in the Supreme Court and the need for judicial independence. This need to 
change and promoting the notion of institutional autonomy may aid in achieving this by 
offering a clearer and more measurable set of criteria and justifications for independent 
courts. 
                                                        
208 K Malleson, ‘The evolving role of the Supreme Court’ (2011) Public Law 754, 772. 
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At the beginning of this thesis the issue of a growth of judicial power was discussed, with 
specific reference to the increase in judicial review and the implementation of the Human 
Rights Act. This growth of power has continued and is now being discussed more specifically 
in relation to the decisions being made by the UKSC. The idea of the Supreme Court having 
more power than when it was the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords is an issue of 
contention within the Court itself. Last November, Lord Hope of Craighead, the Deputy 
President of the Court, gave a speech entitled ‘Do We Really Need a Supreme Court?’209 As 
Hope states, the question is redundant in terms of getting rid of the Court since it is contained 
in statute. But what he did want to highlight and clarify was the developing role of the Court. 
He notes that it has done more than iron out a ‘constitutional wrinkle’ but has rather created a 
new institution with great constitutional significance.210 Malleson notes how this 
acknowledgement of change was not welcomed by the former President of the Court, Lord 
Phillips. Phillips maintained that the reforms would not change the functions of the 
Committee within the Supreme Court; a view supported by Lord Bingham at the time.211 It is 
not clear whether the former President’s reluctance to allow court to become too powerful 
prevented it changing. It will be interesting to observe the change in the Court following the 
retirement of Lord Phillips, and over the coming years, to see whether more prescriptive rules 
or informal conventions develop to restrict the Court’s influence and maintain equilibria, or 
whether the Court’s focus may change with a change to the presidency. 
 
 
 
                                                        
209 Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Do We Really Need a Supreme Court?’ 25 November 2010, speech given at 
Newcastle Law School < http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_101125.pdf > accessed 23 October 
2011. 
210 Ibid., p10. 
211 K Malleson, ‘The evolving role of the Supreme Court’ (2011) Public Law 756. 
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Development of the notion of institutional autonomy 
The notion of institutional autonomy is relevant to any judicial institution as the rule of law 
dictates the need for an independent judiciary, universally. A consideration of the elements of 
institutional autonomy will enable an assessment to be made in relation to that judicial 
institution’s independence. However, it is unlikely that it would be necessary or desirable for 
the lower courts to have the same level of institutional autonomy as top courts. This may stem 
from the need for a progressive scale of institutional autonomy to be developed. The 
importance of each requisite element will differ depending on the institution’s design and 
intended purpose. This echoes the need for a detailed assessment and understanding of 
institutional design. The levels of expected budgetary freedom and administrative freedom 
and what counts as unnecessary interference will differ from those of the Supreme Court as 
outlined above. Arguably, the higher courts require a higher level of institutional autonomy as 
they are involved in monitoring the actions of the Executive, through judicial review and 
under the Human Rights Act.  
 
The final consideration for this thesis is how institutional autonomy should be viewed, both 
presently and as a notion for development. At present, a notion of institutional autonomy is all 
that can be offered for consideration. However, if it were to be deemed a useful and 
worthwhile addition to enhance the statutory need for ensuring greater judicial independence, 
then there may be reasons for giving it more strength. There would need to be discussion of 
whether its existence as a notion was sufficient to rely on it. It may develop informally as a 
concept or convention through an established practice of applying the elements or there may 
be call for more stringent application by inclusion in policy or legislation. This, sadly, is not 
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something this thesis can predict but it will be an interesting focus for future discussion of the 
need for judicial independence within the UK constitution.  
The justification for these ideas will become clear as the role of the Supreme Court evolves. If 
the Court develops into something which mirrors the US Supreme Court, a more 
constitutional court, then a notion of institutional autonomy will be particularly important. As 
the Court accepts greater constitutional responsibility and power, the interference in the three 
areas of institutional autonomy will be greater too. Thus, ensuring a high level of institutional 
autonomy is even more crucial to support and evidence the independence required by the rule 
of law. Malleson outlines various ways in which the nature of the top court is changing and 
indicating a move towards affording the Justices greater power and recognition of the notion 
of institutional autonomy may serve in, ‘strengthen the legitimacy of an increasingly powerful 
and high-profile Supreme Court.’212   
                                                        
212 K Malleson, ‘The evolving role of the Supreme Court’ (2011) Public Law 772. 
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